

The Obama and Erdoğan Administrations: From Model Partnership to Geopolitical Rivalry?



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Abstract

In the Cold War, the Turkish military command looked for a close connection with the US and Europe, viewing the Near East and world politics through a Western prism. The parliamentary ruling in Ankara hindering US troops from crossing Turkish territory for the Iraq invasion may, however, have led to a turn in the bilateral relations with the US. Was Turkey reorienting its foreign policy from the West toward the Middle East, improving ties with Iran and Russia?

I. Introduction

Turkey's relations with its neighbors have been steadily improving. The tense relations of the mid-nineties stand in stark contrast to the good neighborly relations that Ankara has succeeded in cultivating with its neighbors in the last decade. The improvement in relations with Russia and Iran, former rivals, is exemplary. Turkey's Foreign Minister, Ahmet Davutoğlu, has held the 'zero problems' policy that foreign relations should be governed by the principles of good neighborliness.

Turkey's role as regional power in the 'Greater Middle East' constitutes a reason for self-dependence in the identification of national interests in opposition to the US, NATO, and the EU, as does Turkey's neutrality in conflicts where its security is not immediately threatened. For Ankara, the regionalization of the Kurdish issue after the Gulf War stood out as the most important issue. Its regionalization caused controversial outcomes for all neighbors, while the creation of the state of Kurdistan in Northern Iraq brought Turkey, Iran, and Syria together in search of countermeasures.

"Turkey has been left with little political capital to expend on influencing events in the Middle East. After a period during which Ankara pursued the vision of

*'zero problems with neighbors,' it now has nothing but problems. It has called for the ouster of Syria's Assad, does not recognize the legitimacy of Egypt's new military government, has cut off diplomatic ties with Israel, angered Iran through the acceptance of a NATO radar installation and through its support for Syrian rebels, quarreled with the Iraqi central government in Baghdad, angered powerful Gulf Arab states with its aggressive support for the Muslim Brotherhood, and alienated Europe with unfounded accusations and conspiracy theories."*¹

In recent years, US relations with Ankara have deteriorated and Turkey's candidacy for membership in the European Union (EU) has foundered. Many observers have been troubled by these developments. Will Turkey fulfil its leading role as a sovereign regional power to advance its secular, democratic, and Western-oriented system in the Greater Middle East, counterbalancing the Islamic Republic of Iran in the Arabic- and Turkic-speaking world? After the collapse of the USSR and the resulting political vacuum in Central Asia and the Caucasus, US political scientists forecasted that a "New Great Game" would take place in the region between Iran and Turkey under the patronage of the US and Russia.²

Former national security adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski thus concluded that the great power controlling Eurasia would rule the world.³ The pillars of Turkey's Kemalist nature, such as its strict separation of religion and state (laicism) as well as its Western-oriented economy, were designed to lead to the Islamic world's attachment to the West through military alliances, if possible, and its opening up through economic cooperation. The United States therefore insists on the acceptance of secular Turkey into the EU so that Islamic radicalism will lose its attraction.⁴

¹ Morton I. Abramowitz and Eric S. Edelman (Eds.): From Rhetoric to Reality: Reframing U.S. Turkey Policy. (Bipartisan Policy Center: Washington, D.C. October 2013), p. 45.

² Zbigniew Brzezinski: Die einzige Weltmacht. Amerikas Strategie der Vorherrschaft, Berlin 1997 pp. 66-68.

³ Ibid, p.76.

⁴ So the U.S. President George W. Bush at the Istanbul NATO summit. Elisabeth Bumiller and Christine Hauser: Bush courts Turks and presses Nato. *International Herald Tribune* June 28, 2004, pp.1 and 4.

*(...) Pushing for a Middle East that looks more like Turkey than Iran seems eminently more likely and desirable in the long run.*⁵

Besides the great power rivalry for influence between the US and Russia in Eurasia, a competition for regional hegemony between Shiite Iran and NATO member Turkey is also taking place. The US is primarily initiating a contest of systems in the region because Washington intends to counter the power vacuum and resulting instability that led to Tehran's success in spreading its brand of Islam.⁶ In this competition, the US envisions Turkey's role as that of a countervailing power to the extremist influence of the Islamic Republic of Iran – which is currently under US and EU sanctions – in the republics of Central Asia and the autonomous regions of the Caucasus.⁷

*“During the past decade, Turkey has become the rising power in Europe, arguably the world's most influential Muslim country and a dynamic inspiration for young Arab reformers. Turkey is the only European country that has grown in power since the financial crisis and the start of the Arab uprisings. While European economic fortunes have contracted, Turkey has one of the fastest growing global economies. Turkey may even now be more powerful in the Middle East than Germany, France, and the United Kingdom. This is all supremely ironic for a country long excluded from positions of power in NATO and which has had the door to the European Union slammed shut in recent years.”*⁸

In short, the decision of the European Council in December 2004, opposing the start of EU accession talks with Turkey, contradicted US geopolitical ambitions, since Washington feared that the influential Islamic circles in

Turkey's ruling party AKP could use this occasion to pursue a renunciation of the Western alliance in favor of an alignment with Russia and Iran, rivals of the West.⁹

*“Will inclusion of a predominantly Muslim country contribute to a stronger EU and facilitate Turkey's role as a model of democracy in the region? Or will inclusion of a large, predominantly Muslim, and lesser developed country have a destabilizing impact on the EU's coherence and stability and yield negative repercussions for Turkey and the region?”*¹⁰

Considering the question of Turkey's EU accession exclusively from a security and geopolitical perspective, as the US does, Turkish membership appears to be the right step. Furthermore, the EU represents a geopolitical community of stability according to the theory of integration, “(...) arguing that greater interdependence in the form of transnational ties could lead to peace.”¹¹ After the Second World War, the European ‘peace community’¹² is said to have guaranteed the European nations' security through mutual reconciliation and the reduction of violence between states.¹³

Turkey wants to become a regional power using its soft power resources. Davutoğlu's strategic depth doctrine brings a multi-dimensional approach to foreign policy with mutually reinforcing and interlocking processes. The AKP government employs diplomatic means and cultural as well as economic incentives more than military means to pursue foreign policy. US administrations have depicted Turkey as a “role model” in the Greater Middle East. In the US view, Turkey represents an Islamic nation with a stable and secular democracy oriented to the West, which might contain the influence of Iran. The US perceives Turkey's ruling party, the AKP, as mildly Islamist, serving as a “role model” to other

⁵ Joshua W. Walker: “A FELLOW'S VIEW: Inshallah, A Middle East Like Turkey Not Iran.” *Belfer Center Newsletter*, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School. Summer 2011.

⁶ Max Boot: Bush can't afford inaction on Iran. *Los Angeles Times*, September 9, 2004.

⁷ Udo Steinbach: Kemalismus oder Fundamentalismus. Die modellpolitische Konkurrenz zwischen der Türkei und dem Iran und die Zukunft der islamischen Welt. *Blätter für deutsche und internationale Politik* 37 (1992), Heft 7 pp. 817-829 (p. 819).

⁸ Nicholas R. Burns: “The Rise of Turkey as a Superpower.” *Boston Globe*, April 27, 2012.

⁹ Henri J. Barkey: Geopolitics. Turkey's chill further isolates Israel. *Los Angeles Times*, September 8, 2004.

¹⁰ Demet Yalcin Mousseau: “The Impact of the European Union on Democracy in Turkey and Its Implications for the Region.” Paper, *The Brookings Institution and Sabanci University*, May 2006. p.1.

¹¹ Robert Jackson and Georg Sorenson: Introduction to International Relations. Oxford, 1999, pp. 114-115.

¹² Werner Weidenfeld: Die Europäische Union. Paderborn 2010, p. 13.

¹³ Daniel Frei: Integrationsprozess, Werner Weidenfeld (Ed.): Die Identität Europas, Bonn 1985, pp.113-132.

countries in the region.

II. Setbacks to the Model Partnership

The parliamentary ruling in Ankara to refuse the passage of US troops through Turkish territory for an invasion of Iraq precipitated a change in bilateral relations with the US. Did the US invasion in Iraq consequently undermine and thwart Ankara's strategic room for maneuver? The decisive factor was the apprehension shown by Turkish officials that the invasion could cause the destabilization and partition of Iraq. In addition, Ankara was rightly concerned by the increasing influence of Iran. The Turkish leadership recognized another menace in the rise of Kurdish nationalism and its aspiration to independence and self-determination, which would also call into question the territorial integrity of Turkey by its own Kurdish minority.¹⁴

The US establishment was caught off guard by the new Turkish strategy in the Near East, which ran contrary to US policies. In particular, the coordinated Turkish efforts with Brazil to anticipate the US isolation and further sanctioning of Iran hindered the US diplomatic attempt to broker a consensus between the veto powers of the UN Security Council. This appeared to US diplomats as a Turkish challenge to Washington to distinguish itself in its sphere of influence at the expense of US power. Is Turkey striving to overcome the Cold War order and the dependence on US foreign policy?¹⁵ Does a close cooperation with its neighbors offer Turkey the opportunity to contain US influence in the region? Could an anti-American stance also open new communication lines with the Organization of Islamic States and lead to an improvement in relations with the EU? Turkey is ostensibly encouraging more democracy in neighboring states such as Iran in order to prevent US intervention.¹⁶

*"Turkey is a major regional player but its relations with neighboring Syria have worsened over the months of bloodletting, during which Ankara has sided with those Western and Arab powers seeking the ouster of President Bashar al-Assad."*¹⁷

Turkey's role as regional power in the 'Greater Middle East' constitutes a reason for self-dependence in the identification of national interests in opposition to the US, NATO, and the EU, as does Turkey's neutrality in conflicts where its security is not immediately threatened. In these areas of conflict, Turkey aligns its foreign policy with the US, Europe, and NATO.¹⁸ Otherwise, the Turkish Prime Minister Erdoğan points out that good relations with Russia and China will not replace those with the EU, NATO, or the USA.¹⁹

*"EU membership would anchor Turkey in the West, fortify it as a firewall against terrorism, and help make it a model of democracy for the Muslim world. Rejection, on the other hand, would set back domestic reforms and radicalize religious extremists. Instead of a bulwark of stability and moderation, Turkey would become a hotbed of anti-Americanism and extremism. Rather than serving as a beachhead for Western interests in the Middle East, it would join the arc of unstable countries in the region that oppose the liberal values that form the foundation of the EU."*²⁰

Thus, former US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates contended that the West risked losing Turkey. Mr Gates accused the EU of denying the accession of a Muslim nation to the EU and causing Ankara to turn east. Former French President Nicolas Sarkozy and German Chancellor Angela Merkel have repeatedly denied accession to Turkey and instead

¹⁴ Bernard Gwertzman and F. Stephen Larrabee: Managing a More Assertive Turkey. *Council on Foreign Relations*, June 3, 2010.

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ Ozan Örmeci: Turkey's Role in the Organization of Islamic Conference, JDP Government and the Greater Middle East Project. *caspianweekly.com*, May 29, 2010.

¹⁷ Rod Norland, Sebnem Arsu and Alan Cowell: Defections and Downed Turkish Jet Worsen Syria Crisis. *New York Times*, June 25 2012.

¹⁸ Wandel in der türkischen Aussen- und Sicherheitspolitik. Ankara zwischen den Vereinigten Staaten, der Europäischen Union und dem Mittleren Osten. *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, October 6, 2006.

¹⁹ Erdogan bekräftigt EU-Kurs der Türkei. *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, September 1, 2007.

²⁰ David L. Phillips: Turkey's Dreams of Accession. *Foreign Affairs*, September/October 2004.

proposed “privileged partnership”. Sarkozy rebuked President Obama when the US President advised the EU to take Turkey in.²¹ Can the AKP change this development or will its Islamist past stop the party from promoting Turkey’s accession bid?²²

III. Turkey a Pivotal Ally in Eurasia

The cut-throat competition between Turkey and Iran for regional hegemony did not first start in the early 1990s. The rivalry can be traced back to the 16th century, when Ottomans and Safavids contended for the exertion of influence in the north of the Caucasus and Central Asia.²³ Vast parts of the Caucasus belonged to the Ottoman Empire. The population of Central Asia is predominantly Sunni and Turkic-speaking, whereby at the same time the Persian influence is substantial. Iran’s geographic location as the “land bridge between Central Asia and the Persian Gulf” has been carrying great weight for centuries, since the country served as a center of the old Silk Road.²⁴

After the disintegration of the USSR, the US essentially initiated a system of contention in the region because it feared a power vacuum and the accompanying instability. The rivalry between laical Turkey and theocratic Iran was encouraged by the West, which prevented Tehran from exporting the Islamic revolution to the new republics of Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan.²⁵ De facto, the US attempted to portray its ally in Ankara as an alternative to Tehran. In particular, James Baker, then US Secretary of State, appealed during his state visit to Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan in February 1992 “(...) to follow Turkey, rather than Iran”.²⁶ This owed to the reality that Turkey and Iran were competing as po-

tential transit countries for Caspian oil and Turkmenian gas. The situation seemed favorable for Turkey given the fact that Iran was politically and economically weakened after the First Gulf War. Hence, the presidency of Turgut Özal (1989-1993) marked the start of foreign aid in the realm of education but led to an institutionalization of Central Asian-Turkish relations through the Turkic Summits. The nationalist overture from Ankara has, however, not brought forth a utopian community of the Turkic nations, but rather affected Turkish-Russian discords, whereas Iran tried to establish good relations not only with its neighboring states, but also with Russia, in order to overcome the US’ isolation strategy. Elsewhere, the close links between Turkey and Azerbaijan effectuated the rapprochement of Armenia, Iran, and Russia in the Nagorno-Karabakh question. Russia has never turned its back on its ‘southern belt’ and used the continuing military dependency of the Caucasus and Central Asia post-1991 for a new integration of the republics into the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). Even Baku had no other option than joining the CIS.

Key players such as the US and Russia have power-political interests, primarily in the field of pipelines. The Western-secular model of Turkey is designed to prevent the export of the Islamic Revolution by Iran; thus, the US has supported Ankara in the competition of different systems, promoting its ally against the US-sanctioned regime in Tehran. Therefore, the specialist literature portends the coherence of Turanism in Turkish foreign policy with the export of the Islamic Revolution in Iranian foreign policy.²⁷ In this context, Washington has assumed a leading role – particularly since 9/11 – in building up its Turkish ally as a cornerstone in the region. However, the

²¹ Mark Champion and Peter Spiegel: Gates Says EU Pushed Turkey Away. U.S. Defense Secretary Blames Bloc’s Resistance to Granting Membership for Ankara’s Turn from Israel and the West. *Wall Street Journal*, June 10, 2010.

²² Morton Abramowitz and Henri J. Barkey: Turkey’s Transformers. The AKP Sees Big. *Foreign Affairs*, November/ December 2009.

²³ Udo Steinbach: „Kemalismus oder Fundamentalismus: Die modellpolitische Konkurrenz zwischen der Türkei und dem Iran und die Zukunft der Islamischen Welt.“ *Blätter für deutsche und internationale Politik* 37 (199), Heft 7, pp. 817-829 (p. 819).

²⁴ Johannes Reissner: „Zwischen Persischem Golf und Zentralasien: Neuorientierung der regionalen Außenpolitik Irans“. In: Albrecht Zunker (Ed.) „Weltordnung oder Chaos?“ Festschrift zum 75. Geburtstag von Klaus Ritter. (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft 1993), pp. 361-376 (here: pp. 364-366).

²⁵ Gareth M. Winrow: “Turkish Policy in Central Asia”. In: Touraj Atabaki and John O’Kane (Eds.): *Post-Soviet Central Asia*. (London: I. B. Tauris 1998), pp. 91-108 (here: pp. 96-97).

²⁶ Morton I. Abramowitz,.: Dateline Ankara: After Özal. *Foreign Policy* 91 (1993), pp. 164-181, (p. 164).

²⁷ Alvin Z. Rubinstein and Oles M. Smolansky (Eds.): “Regional Power Rivalries in the New Eurasia. Russia, Turkey, and Iran“. (Armonk, New York, M.E. Sharpe Inc. 1995).

United States backed off from the Nagorno-Karabakh question due to its strong Armenian lobby and pursued its own interests in the region. During the US-led war on terror, Afghanistan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan were brought into the US focus, with military bases installed in these countries.²⁸

Because of this combination of circumstances, Turkey was aware that it needed US assistance to add authority to its ambitions. Beyond that, Ankara knew that its financial capabilities were not sufficient to win lasting influence in the Caucasus and Central Asia. Consequently, Turkey strove to regain the geostrategic significance it had lost at the end of the Cold War by acting as a mediator between Orient and Occident. Its emphasis lay on energy. The US and Turkey cooperated against Iranian and Russian concerns in the construction of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline; with its energy policy, the US intended to contain both Russian and Iranian influence in the region. Accordingly, Ankara acted as Washington's custodian of interests, and the pipelines for Caspian and Central Asian oil and gas were therefore to be built through Turkey. With its sanctions policy, the United States hampered Iran's access to the world market and gave the Central Asian countries reason to keep their distance from Tehran.²⁹ This offset the fact that Russia and Iran were the principal gas suppliers to Turkey.³⁰

*"Turkey imports around 55 percent of its natural gas needs and 12 percent of its oil from Russia, and it curiously turned to Russia for its first nuclear plant as well. Dependence on these resources has shaped Ankara's foreign policy toward Moscow, tempering Turkish frustration with Russian policy"*³¹.

Turkey's primary objective was to cover its own demand for energy. Therefore, it increas-

ingly turned towards gas-rich Iran, where it faced the problem that a pipeline had to be constructed through Iran. This, however, represented less of a problem for Ankara than for Washington. With its sanctions, the United States has frustrated cooperation between Turkmenistan, Iran, and Turkey, meaning that Ankara continues to be dependent on Russian gas and Moscow has been able to use this as a joker in the 'New Great Game'. By implication, Russia keeps its hegemony in Eurasia because the West has shied away from investment ventures in the Caucasus and Central Asia.³² A dilemma confronts Turkey: on the one hand, it is pursuing the goal of uncoupling its sister states from infrastructural dependency on Moscow by transporting gas and oil pipelines through its own territory to Europe; on the other hand, it remains dependent on the gas supplier Russia because of its high energy demand. To reduce its dependency on Russia in the energy sector, Turkey would have to approach Iran.³³

*"The field of energy policy seems to be intertwined with the rest of Turkey's regional foreign policy and is linked to Turkey's rise as a regional power. There is also a tension inherent in this policy, in that Turkey is involved in both the Russian-backed South Stream project and the E.U.- and U.S.-backed Nabucco project. These are widely regarded as competing projects, but the Turks seem to ignore this conflict altogether."*³⁴

Turkey is a key state for the EU, which intends to split its energy supplies after the gas dispute between Russia and Ukraine. At present, the EU imports more than 40% of its gas from one corporation: the Russian Gazprom. Moreover, almost all gas to Europe from the Caspian Sea arrives via Gazprom's pipelines. Yet the Nabucco pipeline – for the transport of Azerbaijani, Turkmen, and perhaps one day

²⁸ Rainer Freitag-Würminghaus: „Zentralasien und der Kaukasus nach dem 11. September: Geopolitische Interessen und der Kampf gegen den Terrorismus“. *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte* B8/ 2002, pp. 3-13.

²⁹ Shireen T Hunter: "Iran between the Gulf and the Caspian Basin: Strategic and Economic Implications". Abu Dhabi, The Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research 2000, pp. 36-38.

³⁰ Gareth M Winrow.: "Pivotal State or Energy Supplicant? Domestic Structure, External Actors, and Turkish Policy in the Caucasus". *Middle East Journal* 57 (2003), Issue 1, pp. 76-92.

³¹ Soner Cagaptay and James F. Jeffrey: "Turkey's Muted Reaction to the Crimean Crisis." *Policy Watch* 2219, Washington Institute for Near East Policy, March 4, 2014.

³² Kutlay Arin: „The New Great Game? Der iranisch-türkische Verdrängungswettbewerb um die regionale Hegemonie seit Beginn der 90er Jahre“. (Master thesis Ludwig-Maximilians-University Munich 2003), p.92.

³³ *Ibid.*, p. 101.

³⁴ Einar Wiggen: "Pipe Dreams or Dream Pipe? Turkey Hopes of Becoming an Energy Hub". *The Middle East Journal* Vol. 66, No. 4 (Autumn 2012), pp- 598-612.

of Iranian and Iraqi gas into the EU over Turkey – faces a big obstacle: the relationship of Turkey with the EU, wherein even the technical arrangements of the energy transit are politically laden.³⁵

IV. Changing Geopolitics and the Kurdish Question in Turkish Foreign Policy

In the Cold War, Israel was Turkey's sole democratic ally in a troubled region. Both countries had faced the same threat: Syrian support for radical Palestinian organizations in the case of Israel, and the PKK in the case of Turkey.³⁶ According to Mead, Turkey's accusation against Israel³⁷ at the UN Security Council of the deadly attack on the Gaza flotilla carrying humanitarian aid from Turkey proved that Ankara had decisively moved away from its longstanding partnership with the US.³⁸

"In the Middle East, taking an anti-American line builds Turkish influence and opens doors across the region. Fading Russian and European power in the Middle East creates a vacuum which a newly ambitious Turkey can hope to fill; anti-American and anti-Israel policies win friends and supporters for Turkey as it flexes its regional muscles. Turkey feels increasingly confident that it can manage its relationship with Russia without an American big brother to protect it."³⁹

Since the administration of Bush senior, the US has been undertaking steps towards the establishment of an independent Kurdish state, claims Ozan Ömerci, who summarises the Turkish concerns. In addition, Washington tolerated the PKK's presence in Iraq even though it had declared it a terrorist organization.⁴⁰ In 1991, the Turkish general staff thus

prevented the deployment of its troops despite President Özal's aspiration to liberate Kuwait in the US-led war against Iraq. In 2002/03, the relations with Washington worsened as Ankara declined the transit of US soldiers through its territory to Iraq, as a result of which the northern front failed to materialize.⁴¹ In rejecting the Iraq war, Turkey joined "old Europe", a term coined by then Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, meaning the anti-war coalition around France, Germany, and Russia, which was opposed by the "new Europe", the 'coalition of the willing' with the United Kingdom and the former Warsaw-Pact states, which impeded multilateral cooperation in the UN, NATO, and the EU.⁴²

The parliamentary ruling in Ankara preventing US troops from crossing Turkish territory for the Iraq invasion might have led to a turn in the bilateral relations with the US. The decisive factor was the Turkish concern that the invasion could spark the destabilization and the division of Iraq. Furthermore, Ankara was rightly afraid of the increasing Iranian influence. The Turkish leadership recognized another menace in the rise of Kurdish nationalism and in the pursuit of independence and self-determination, which would put into question the territorial integrity of Turkey by its own Kurdish minority. According to Bernard Gwertzman, the US invasion in Iraq undermined and thwarted Ankara's strategic freedom of action.⁴³

"Prime Minister Erdogan and his AK Party also want to set aside Kemalist foreign policy ideas and test the possibilities for a more active Turkish role to the south and east: in the Arab world, in Turkic-language speaking and energy rich Central Asia, with Iran and with Pakistan. Religion is part of the pull; the ruling AK Party is backed by reli-

³⁵ Katinka Barysch: "Why Can't Europe and Turkey Get Along". *Time Magazine*, April 2, 2009.

³⁶ Soner Cagaptay: Is Turkey Leaving the West? An Islamist Foreign Policy Puts Ankara at Odds With Its Former Allies. *Foreign Affairs* October 26., 2009.

³⁷ Anthony H Cordesman.; Israel as a Strategic Liability? Center for Strategic and International Studies, June 2, 2010.

³⁸ Walter Russell Mead: "Terrible Twins: Turkey, Brazil and the Future of American Foreign Policy". *The American Interest*, July/August 2010.

³⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁰ Ozan Ömerci: "Turkey's Role in the Organization of Islamic Conference, JDP Government and the Greater Middle East Project". *Caspian Weekly*, May 29, 2010.

⁴¹ „Wandel in der türkischen Aussen- und Sicherheitspolitik. Ankara zwischen den Vereinigten Staaten, der Europäischen Union und dem Mittleren Osten“. *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, October 6, 2006.

⁴² Werner Weidenfeld: „Die Europäische Union“. (Paderborn: UTB 2010), pp. 26 and 187.

⁴³ Bernard Gwertzman and F. Stephen Larrabee: "Managing a More Assertive Turkey". *Interview at Council on Foreign Relations*, June 3, 2010.

*gious zeal. The world to Turkey's east and south is an unstable and unhappy place, an east-facing Turkey today may be headed for more trouble than its government wants.*⁴⁴

Ankara drew a lot of criticism from the Bush Jr. administration for its good relations with Syria until the US ultimately respected Turkish sensitivities. Turkey had rated Syria as an ally against Kurdish ambitions, whereupon the cross-border trade would create prosperity and trust between Turks, Kurds, and Syrians.⁴⁵ Nevertheless, the possibility of conflict with the Kurds in northern Iraq still existed. Hüseyin Bağcı believes that Turkey has never before been so influential in its history and ascribes this to its credibility as an "honest broker" and as a neutral mediator between different parties.⁴⁶ Bağcı attributes to Turkey an increasing role as a global player, which consequently demands a new European stance through global strategic thinking. For the US, Turkey plays an important part in the stability of northern Iraq. Prior to the Syrian civil war, Ankara enjoyed good relations with Iran and Syria and, according to Bağcı, was thus able to moderate both regimes. Considering the tensions between Iran and the US, Turkey constitutes a strategic partner in the region for Washington, without alternative. Nevertheless, the relations between the West and Turkey are not free of strain.⁴⁷

*"Turkey's U.N. Security Council vote against the newest round of sanctions put it in Iran's camp against Europe, the United States, Russia, and China. That's quite a realignment for a NATO ally. Perhaps even worse is Turkey's push to turn the Israeli-Palestinian conflict into a religious war."*⁴⁸

In particular, the coordinated Turkish efforts with Brazil to anticipate the US isolation and further sanctioning of Iran hindered the US diplomatic attempt to broker a consensus be-

tween the veto powers of the UN Security Council. According to Mead, this appeared to US diplomats as a Turkish challenge to Washington to distinguish itself in its sphere of influence at the expense of US power.⁴⁹

*"When President Barack Obama visited the mausoleum of Turkish Republic founder Mustafa Kemal Atatürk in April 2009, he finished his inscription in the ceremonial Honor Book with one of Atatürk's most famous maxims: 'Peace at home, peace abroad'. This is an ideal Turks and their leaders have always aspired to but consistently failed to live up to."*⁵⁰

Turkey shares a lot of common interests with its neighboring countries. Iraq, Syria, Iran, and Turkey all have sizeable Kurdish minorities, which explains why the US support for the Kurds in northern Iraq brought about a change of strategy in Turkish foreign policy. Regarding the water issue, Syria and Iraq have to cooperate with Turkey and ameliorate their relations. In the common denial of the Kurdish question these states can use the Organization of the Islamic States (OIS) as platform. A close cooperation with its neighbors offers Turkey the opportunity to contain US influence in the region while the anti-American stance opens new communication lines with the OIS and could lead to an improvement in relations with the European Union. Hence, Turkey is ostensibly encouraging more democracy in neighboring states such as Iran in order to prevent US intervention.⁵¹

"Iran's isolation at the Security Council is more than a reflection of American power; it is a reflection of the serious and mounting concern among the other oil producing states about revolutionary Iran. Choosing Iran over the rest of the world is not smart policy for Turkey. Whether the question is economic growth, the Armenian question

⁴⁴ Mead: "Turkey Still Needs The West".

⁴⁵ Steven A. Cook: "How Do You Say 'Frenemy' in Turkish? Meet America's new rival in the Middle East". *Foreign Policy*, June 1, 2010.

⁴⁶ Hüseyin Bağcı: „Die Rolle der Türkei im Mittelmeerraum und im Nahen Osten“. *Center for Applied Policy Research* Forschungskolloquium, October 30, 2008.

⁴⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁸ Elliott Abrams: "Turkey of a Policy. Obama makes the Middle East an even more dangerous place". *The Weekly Standard*. June 21, 2010, Vol. 15, No. 38.

⁴⁹ Mead, "Terrible Twins".

⁵⁰ Steven A. Cook: "Turkey's War at Home". *Survival: Global Politics and Strategy*, vol. 51, no. 5, October–November 2009, pp. 105-120.

⁵¹ Örmeci, "Turkey's Role in the Organization of Islamic Conference".

*or settling the Kurdish problem, a deepening relationship with Iran drives wedges between Turkey and the partners it urgently needs.*⁵²

Ankara's foreign policy is determined by Turkish interests between Europe and the Orient, contrary to transatlantic conceptions.⁵³ The instability in Iraq threatens Turkey's national security, putting Ankara on a collision course with the nationalist Kurds, although Turkey can overcome its difficulties with the Kurdistan Regional Government through political, economic, and diplomatic means. At the same time, the status of Kirkuk and Mosul as well as the political skirmish in Baghdad after the elections also touch Turkish sensitivities. The opening of the Turkish consulate in Erbil indeed testifies to the fact that Turkey did not invade Iraq. Nevertheless, Kurdish and Turkish nationalism confront each other irreconcilably according to Steven Cook.⁵⁴ From a Turkish perspective, the 2003 Iraq War marked a new and dangerous alteration to the Kurdish challenge. Thereafter, the negotiations on a Turkish occupation of the oil province Mosul failed as a result of the opposition of the Iraqi Kurds and of Washington. Kurdistan in Northern Iraq has been under the protection of international law since 1991. From the perspective of the neighboring states, Kurdish independence in Northern Iraq should not be allowed to stabilize, Kurdish nationalism should be contained, and any endeavor of diplomatic recognition of Kurdistan as a state averted.⁵⁵ Erdoğan warned Iraq against partition as the unity of Mesopotamia is vital to Turkey for security reasons. Ankara demanded that the oil wealth of northern Iraq must not be made available exclusively to Kurds, but to all Iraqis.⁵⁶ Nonetheless, rumors abound of Turkey facilitating Kurdish oil exports, including eventually through pipelines, thus bypassing Baghdad.⁵⁷

V. The Turkish War on Terror

Since taking office in 2002, Erdoğan's AKP has been striving for a more democratic and

modern nation and a solution to the biggest domestic challenge: the political, legal, and economic equality of the 14 million Kurds. The push for democracy should offer the Kurds certain individual and cultural freedoms in the hope of ending the decades-long insurgency of the PKK.⁵⁸ However, the military action against the terrorist organization as well as the culture wars between the old secular establishment and the Islamists have put a strain on the relations between Ankara and Brussels. This infighting has menaced not only the reforms of the AKP government, but beyond that the newly-won international prestige of Turkey. Turkey is polarized more than ever before in its history. According to Steven Cook, ever since the violent clashes between left and far-right extremists in the 1970s each political crisis in Turkey has jeopardized the Near East, Europe, and the Caucasus.⁵⁹

The five years of cease-fire from 1999 to 2004 made an economic boom possible in Turkey. Its impact is mainly confined to the west of Anatolia; the Kurdish East was unable to escape from poverty.⁶⁰ The army's intervention in Turkish politics and the war on terror clouded Turkey's EU accession bid. Some fear a new civil war, fought at the expense of both the Kurdish population and the Turkish economy. Political rearrangements, such as concessions to Kurdish autonomy, appear to Turkish nationalists and the military as high treason. Their motto is that Turkey will defeat the terrorists at any price and that democracy and minority rights should not serve to break up the Kemalist nation state.⁶¹

After this announcement, Turkish troops invaded northern Iraq. As a consequence, UN General Secretary Ban Ki Moon demanded that the Turkish government respect Iraqi sovereignty, also calling on the PKK to stop its terrorist attacks on Turkish territory. Ban appealed to the governments in Ankara and Baghdad to cooperate in the stabilization of the border region. Furthermore, the EU asked Turkey to preserve the territorial integrity of Iraq. The US pressured Turkey to confine the

⁵² Mead, „Turkey“

⁵³ „Wandel in der türkischen Aussen- und Sicherheitspolitik“, *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, October 6, 2006.

⁵⁴ Steven A. Cook: „Balancing a Bullish Turkey“. *Council on Foreign Relations*, December 4, 2009.

⁵⁵ „Wandel in der türkischen Aussen- und Sicherheitspolitik“ *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, Oktober 6, 2006.

⁵⁶ „Erdoğan bekräftigt EU-Kurs der Türkei“. *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, September 1, 2007.

⁵⁷ Daniel Dombey and Guy Chazan: „Turkey and Iraq Kurds Close to Energy Deal“. *Financial Times*, December 12, 2012.

⁵⁸ „Erdoğan bekräftigt EU-Kurs der Türkei“.

⁵⁹ Cook, „Turkey's War at Home“.

⁶⁰: „Normen und Werte im west-östlichen Diwan“. *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, Oktober 8, 2005.

⁶¹ Andres Wysling: „Terroristen und Generäle stören den Fortschritt der Türkei“. *Neue Zürcher Zeitung* September 3, 2006.

military action to the PKK.⁶² However, the Turkish jets did not single-handedly attack PKK positions in northern Iraq in December 2007. The US may have supported the attacks with intelligence actions according to a Turkish General.⁶³ In early November 2007, Bush Jr. assured Prime Minister Erdoğan of US assistance in the struggle against the PKK during their meeting in Washington and offered the exchange of information gathered by the intelligence services. In this context, the US President explicitly declared the illegal PKK to be their “common enemy”.⁶⁴ The PKK is also on the EU’s list of terrorist organizations.⁶⁵

“For Turkey’s large and restive Kurdish minority, EU membership offers the prospect of full legal rights, funds for development in the impoverished eastern provinces where many Kurds live, and in general helps tilt Kurdish opinion away from those who favor armed struggle.”⁶⁶

Turkey has no Western understanding of minority rights despite its large minorities of Alevi and Kurds. In the long run, the non-recognition of Kurds as a distinctive ethnicity harms the inner stability of the country and those of its neighboring states Iran, Iraq, and Syria, which also have large Kurdish minorities.⁶⁷ In these three countries, Kurds have been denied cultural and political rights by the authoritarian regimes in Damascus, Baghdad, and Tehran, where their right to self-determination has persistently been oppressed, similarly to in Turkey. Ankara, Damascus, Baghdad, and Tehran reject the integration of the oil-rich city of Kirkuk in Kurdistan. All four states occasionally collaborate in the combat against the PKK.⁶⁸

It is up to the government in Ankara to create the political and economic premises for a lasting agreement with the Kurds. According to

Wysling, the War on Terror requires in the first instance a political solution and not a military one. The AKP should provide human rights, democracy, and the rule of law in its EU accession bid.⁶⁹ However, Turkey has used its geostrategic position and active diplomacy to get elected into the UN Security Council and the G20 in order to play a visible role as mediator in international disputes – while neglecting the peaceful solution of the Kurdish question.⁷⁰

“The Islamist-rooted Justice and Development Party’s vision of inclusive democratic governance, which once found favor in the West and among his people, has largely evaporated – imperiling Turkey’s stability and economic growth and its compact with NATO. If this authoritarian trend is not reversed, the cost to Turkey and its reputation as a Muslim democracy will be great – as will be the cost to the West, which has valued Turkey as an ally”⁷¹.

As far as domestic politics is concerned, the AKP administration faces the challenges of the Kurdish issue and the reordering of the civil-military relationship. If Erdoğan takes on these challenges and solves them, this will remove the obstacles to the EU accession and the economic boom will continue. On the contrary, his failure would trigger nationalism and autocracy, causing violence against minorities and leading to the political instability of the 1990s. Besides external factors, such as the EU requirements and globalization, the civic society must defy the omnipotence of the Turkish apparatus of state (the ‘deep state’).⁷²

VI. The ‘Deep State’, the Minorities and Democratization

While the AKP ran against the military’s interference in politics and the judiciary, it was confronted at the same time as a government

⁶² „Besorgnis über türkische Offensive “Nicht die beste Reaktion”. *Tagesschau*, February 22, 2008.

⁶³ „Nordirak: USA sollen türkischen Luftangriff auf PKK unterstützt haben“. *Spiegel Online*, Dezember 17, 2007. <http://www.spiegel.de/politik/ausland/0,1518,523697,00.html>.

⁶⁴ “Konstruktive Brücke”: Bush will Türkei in der EU sehen“. *Die Presse.com*, January 8, 2008. <http://www.diepresse.com/home/politik/aussenpolitik/353940/index.do>

⁶⁵ „PKK bleibt trotz Gerichtsurteil auf europäischer Terrorliste“. *Eu-Info Deutschland*, April 3, 2008.

⁶⁶ Mead, “Turkey Still Needs The West“.

⁶⁷ „Strategie und der EU-Beitritt der Türkei. Eher sicherheitspolitische Nachteile für die Europäische Union“. *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, March 27, 2007.

⁶⁸ „Die Türkei als Vermittlerin im Nahen Osten. Bemerkenswerte aussenpolitische Wende der Regierung Erdoğan“. *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, August 15, 2008.

⁶⁹ Andres Wysling: „Terroristen und Generäle stören den Fortschritt der Türkei“. *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, September 3 2006.

⁷⁰ Barkey, “Turkey’s Moment of Inflection”.

⁷¹ “Turkey’s Internet Crackdown”. *New York Times*, Editorial Board, February 21, 2014.

⁷² Barkey, “Turkey’s Moment of Inflection”.

party with a possible legal ban. In the course of the EU accession bid, the AKP incurred the wrath of the army by recognizing the democratic rights of the Kurds. The diplomatic rapprochement with the Islamic neighboring states in the Near East, Central Asia, and the Caucasus was not only viewed with suspicion from the West. Critics both at home and abroad brought forward claims of a stealthy Islamization of Turkish bureaucracy.⁷³

“In the last two years the government has also pursued a wide-ranging investigation into Ergenekon, criminal gangs whose members are accused of plotting to destabilize Turkey through acts of violence, prompting the military to step in and force AKP from office. Initially, Turkish liberals welcomed the case, as it promised to uncover the conspiracies of the so-called ‘deep state,’ which was responsible for a variety of criminal activities, and was believed to be composed of extreme nationalists opposed to democracy and the West. Yet the government has increasingly used the cover of the Ergenekon case to crush its political opponents, most of whom are fierce critics of the AKP but have no connection to violent plots against the Turkish state.”⁷⁴

Erdoğan’s electoral victory in 2002 raised hopes for a peaceful solution to the Kurdish issue, but the generals put his administration under pressure to act resolutely against the Kurdish insurgents. The Turkish army obtained the prolongation of its mandate for cross-border incursions into northern Iraq. Moreover, the military command banned the Kurdish DTP, which had won 21 seats in the Grand Assembly in 2007, while liberals saw this as democratic progress. At the start of the legislative period, the generals were not present, which signaled to the lawmakers what had to be done. Soon afterwards they decided to ban the DTP, accusing it of being the political wing of the PKK.⁷⁵ Turkish nationalists and the opponents of EU membership always

invoke the spirit of Sèvres. The peace treaty from 1920 was dictated by the victorious powers of the First World War and intended the separation of the Ottoman Empire. For the Turks, a small rump state was all that remained. In Eastern Anatolia, independent Armenian and Kurdish states were to emerge, while Turkey would lose territory to Greece in the west. After heavy human losses in the war of independence, in 1923 the Treaty of Lausanne recognized Turkey without mentioning an Armenian or Kurdish state.⁷⁶

“For one thing, the more ‘Middle Eastern’ Turkey looks – the more it is engaged in regional politics – the less likely it is to join the EU. The prospect of joining the European Union is one of the few goals that the new government shares with the old establishment. For the AK Party, joining the EU will force the Turkish military to continue its retreat from politics. Military coups aren’t allowed in the European Union. For the secularists, EU laws on human rights and free expression will limit the ability of the religious lobby to ‘Islamize’ Turkish public life.”⁷⁷

It is not surprising that the fascist putschists in the ‘Ergenekon’ conspiracy alleged that the EU planned to destroy the Turkish unitary state. The coup plotters perceived the Kemalist state to be under threat from domestic and foreign enemies and thus wanted to establish a military dictatorship. According to the indictment, prominent Kurds were to be assassinated with the aim of unleashing an ethnic conflict that would allow the initiation of a junta. Liberals hoped that the case would bring a reckoning with the infamous ‘deep state’⁷⁸, unveiling the vast linkage between security forces, politicians, and right-wing extremists in order to find the perpetrators of thousands of extra-judicial killings – including of Kurdish lawmakers, human rights advocates, and rebels – as well as bringing the responsible officials of the ‘deep state’ to justice.⁷⁹

⁷³ Morton Abramowitz and Henry J Barkey: “Turkey’s Transformers. The AKP Sees Big”. *Foreign Affairs* November/ December 2009.

⁷⁴ Cook, “Balancing a Bullish Turkey”.

⁷⁵ „Türkisch-kurdischer Konflikt eskaliert. Nach schweren Gefechten nimmt der Druck auf die Regierung zu“. *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, Oktober 6, 2008.

⁷⁶ „Die Türkei braucht einen festen europäischen Anker“. *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, Oktober 21, 2006.

⁷⁷ Mead, “Turkey Still Needs The West”.

⁷⁸ Boris Kalnoky: „Türkischer Generalstabschef legt sich mit Premier Erdogan an. Militär erbost über Festnahmen von Offizieren“. *Die Welt*, January 9. 2009.

⁷⁹ „Prozess gegen Verschwörer in der Türkei. Prominente Nationalisten wegen Umsturzversuchs angeklagt“. *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*. Oktober 21. 2008.

“Unlike the secular Kemalists who want to continue Kemal Ataturk’s foreign and domestic policies, Prime Minister Erdoğan and his AK Party seek to dismantle Ataturk’s legacy of fierce, anti-religious secularism at home (and to dismantle the sometimes Orwellian state apparatus that Turkish analysts call the ‘deep state’ which enforced the Kemalist consensus).”⁸⁰

In the end, to many observers it seemed as if the Erdoğan administration was exacting revenge on military officers for their 1997 coup against the Erbakan administration. Among the seven arrested ex-generals there were some coup plotters. In 1997, the army put an ultimatum to Erbakan, which he initially fulfilled but then rejected.⁸¹

VII. The US, Turkey and the Syrian Civil War

The Russian proposal to put Syria’s chemical weapons under UN control was caused by the US preparations to punish Bashar al-Assad by degrading his capability to deploy weapons of mass destruction against his own people. There is a strong US national security imperative to at least contain the conflict in Syria, ensure that the regime’s chemical weapons do not fall into al-Qaeda’s hands, and prevent the neighborhood from being destabilized. Military strikes should aim to create conditions for peace negotiations. Its goals should include limiting the influence of Islamic extremists and creating conditions for peace negotiations.

The Iran-Syria-Hizbollah alliance is a constant threat to regional stability. The civil war has reignited sectarian tensions in fragile Iraq and Lebanon. Achieving US objectives in the Syrian civil war is an opportunity to pressure Iran into making hard choices, not only in Syria but also regarding its nuclear program. If Prime Minister Erdoğan can convince President Obama that he is serious on military strikes, Iran will know the risks. Syria has become an arena for a confrontation between Arab Sunni states, Turkey, and Iran, but also between Russia and the West. The US support for the Syrian opposition will inevitably run counter to Tehran’s interests, forcing Assad to the negotiating table and Tehran to become more involved in Syria in order to rescue its staunch

ally. This would harm Iran financially, militarily, and politically. These costs would make the Ayatollahs reassess their aspirations to acquire a nuclear bomb.

The AKP administration is demanding that the US should use military strikes against the al-Assad regime and its allies to change the military balance of power in Syria. Moderate opposition groups that the United States and Turkey are supporting in Syria are in retreat. There are therefore calls for Washington to arm the rebels in order to counterbalance the military aid of Iran and its client, Hezbollah, in the fight on al-Assad’s side. Turkish officials believe that if the United States supplies arms to the rebels, this will cause a crucial opening for talks. Russia and China may then recalculate and help lead Syria to a real peace process.

In Erdoğan’s view, Congress should support the President’s decision in favor of military strikes against al-Assad if negotiations on the international control of Syrian chemical weapons fail. While the US stood at the sidelines when Saddam Hussein used poison gas against Kurds and Persians, 25 years later US decision-makers have left all options on the table despite their rejection by the majority of Americans. There is a moral imperative in trying to stop the onslaught against civilians. Furthermore, for Turkey’s national security, Iran should not become a hostile regional hegemony in the Persian Gulf. From the US national security standpoint, an Iran hostile to the United States should not acquire the nuclear bomb, the US should maintain good relations with the region’s pro-Western regimes, and sectarian strife should be contained for these to survive.

“In the Middle East, Turkey has moved from being held up as a model to a position of quasi-irrelevance in a number of countries, such as Egypt, Iraq, and Syria, at least for the time being. But it is perhaps with the European Union that the fallout from the current political crisis could have the harshest consequences. The recurrent anti-Israeli, anti-Semitic discourse adopted by the highest levels of the Turkish government has created permanent irritation in Washington and Brussels”⁸².

⁸⁰ Mead, “Turkey Still Needs The West”.

⁸¹ „Prozess gegen Verschwörer“.

⁸² Marc Pierini: “How Far Backward is Turkey Sliding?” *Carnegie Europe*, March 3, 2014.

The Turkish foreign policy based on “zero problems with neighbors”, aiming to achieve economic prosperity while augmenting Turkey’s influence and attraction in the Islamic societies, has lacked impact, particularly in Syria. The designers of Turkish foreign policy were taken aback by the Arab Spring.⁸³ The Arab Spring made Ankara change its regional policies, altering its reaction to the protesters several times. While in Egypt, Turkey asked Mubarak to step down, Ankara at first disapproved of the humanitarian intervention of NATO in Libya, before joining ranks with its allies. Similarly in Syria, Turkey tried in vain to convince al-Assad to parley with the Syrian opposition, before the ongoing civil war coerced Erdoğan to switch sides and join the anti-Assad camp in 2011. The Arab Spring changed everything. Turkey at first gained international prominence as a role model, attracting the approval of the Arab protesters and their political representatives, but soon afterwards Turkey’s image began to fade.

“Turkey, a member of NATO and some-time-EU-aspirant, is able to play an out-sized role in geopolitics. Yet its position also makes it vulnerable. Its borders with Syria and Iran are appealing routes through which to circumvent the sanctions on Iran and to deliver materiel, money, and fighters to the conflict in Syria. Indeed, no recent theater of war has been easier for outsiders to join than Syria thanks to next-door Turkey’s global and low-cost air transportation infrastructure”⁸⁴.

In the context of the Syrian civil war, Turkey is facing growing criticism as a Sunni force allegedly fueling sectarianism both in Syria and in Iraq. The re-emergence of sectarian violence in Syria and Iraq has coaxed Turkey and Iran into a renewed pattern of competition. Ankara and Tehran have openly backed opposing camps in the Syrian civil war. Turkey’s decision to support the rebels did not necessarily stem from sectarian sentiment but it has been widely interpreted as such by its opponents. Similarly, Turkey is backing the Sunni Arabs and Kurds in Iraq against the Shiite government of Nuri al-Maliki in Baghdad. Turkey has answered Iran’s challenge to re-

gional hegemony by widening its influence in the northern parts of both Iraq and Syria. This new constellation makes for a more contentious relation with Syria, Iraq, and Iran. On the other hand, Turkey has forged close ties with Sunni regimes such as Qatar and Saudi Arabia in order to oust Assad and counterbalance Iran. This Sunni axis is coming to embody the sectarian polarization of the Near East: Sunni-Shiite rivalry is shaping the region again.⁸⁵

Having grown accustomed to viewing the Middle East through a sectarian lens, the Turks believe that Washington has surrendered Iraq and Syria to the Shiites, and for that matter to Iran. By using Syria to promote anti-Americanism, Tehran may derive immediate political benefit – supporting al-Assad means resisting the West. If the sectarian fires grow, the first victims could be Lebanon and Iraq, with their unhappy history of Shiite-Sunni violence; the international community has barely managed to contain this in past wars. There is still time for the United States to control this growing sectarian threat. But Washington fears the unknown after al-Assad, and is reluctant to get dragged into a war in another Muslim country. Yet Washington should also be aware that the Syrian conflict has shown signs of becoming a stress test for US-Turkish relations.

Ankara’s long-term commitment to the NATO alliance should not be taken for granted. This makes a unilateral Turkish foray into Syria extremely risky for Ankara. Turkey is still tempted by the desire to cast itself as purely a Muslim power that has sway over the Muslim Middle East. But it has not amassed the necessary hard power to match its soft power, leaving it unable to shape events in the region. Washington, for its part, also appears to have growing concerns over Turkey’s reaction to the Syrian civil war, worrying it could potentially trigger a military conflict between Turkey, a NATO ally, and Syria, thus pulling the United States into a military operation to help Ankara. This would be an unwelcome development for the White House, which would surely want to avoid becoming embroiled in another conflict so close to the congressional elections. Ankara seems to be betting that al-Assad will not risk any further strikes on Turkish assets if

⁸³ Soli Özel: Reshuffling the Cards: Turkey, Israel, and the United States in the Middle East. William B. Quandt (ed.): *Troubled Triangle. The United States, Turkey, and Israel in the New Middle East.* (Charlottesville, Va.: Just World Publishing 2011), pp. 37-55.

⁸⁴ Tom Keatinge: “Turkey’s Dirty Money. Why Turkey Is Still on the FATF’s Gray List?” *Foreign Affairs*, February 25, 2014.

⁸⁵ Soner Cagaptay: “Ankara’s Middle East Policy Post-Arab Spring”. *The Washington Institute for Near East Policy*. Policy Notes No. 16, November 2013.

NATO makes clear that it will stand firmly with Turkey. The Turks also know that, to achieve such a commitment from NATO, they can play the dynamics of the US election year. The crisis in Syria and rivalry with Iran should remind Turkey of the importance of having a strong NATO partner for defensive purposes. Ankara wants to address the Syria conflagration now, while Washington favors a more prudent policy in contrast. In order to realize peace, Washington must sustain dialogue with the Turks on Syria and other regional matters. This requires a better understanding of the areas of convergence and divergence in Ankara and Washington's visions for Syria's future. Washington has failed to use its still-strong influence (in particular, its arms sales) to rein in Erdoğan's power-grabbing and sectarian excesses. Ankara knows that it does not have the military means to contend with the disintegration of the al-Assad regime; thus Turkey can only regain its uniqueness if it revitalizes its ties with the West. Ankara needs to work closely with Washington in order to shield itself from the instability of the Syrian War. If it fails to secure US assistance against the al-Assad regime, it could lose this war. Iran has thrown its full support behind the al-Assad regime, and has ably undermined Ankara's policy of regime change in Damascus. There is also an emerging threat in allowing radical fighters into northern Syria. This is a dangerous game, for once the al-Assad regime falls, Turkey might find itself with a jihadist problem in its newly acquired sphere of influence.

"In northern Syria, for instance, the PKK-affiliated Kurdish Democratic Union Party (PYD) has been fighting Islamist radicals. Until recently, Turkey was reportedly supporting Jihadist groups against the PKK affiliate. (...) Turkey has also turned a blind eye to weapons transfers from its territory to Jabhat al-Nusra, a radical Islamist militant group, hoping to boost the Syrian opposition against the Assad regime and keep the PYD in check".⁸⁶

Opponents of this policy believe that Ankara's policies could usher in a dramatic collapse of the al-Assad regime, which could be taken advantage of by Syrian Kurdish groups pushing for an independent Kurdish state. For Bashar's father Hafez, the PKK was a convenient instrument to help settle old scores over the disputed territory of Hatay, and more directly to force Turkey's hand on water-sharing disagreements from the Euphrates and the Tigris. As a result, Turkey again faces hard power threats from the PKK, Iran, and Syria simultaneously, while struggling to reassess its relationship with the Free Syrian Army as the conflict intensifies. Given that it aims for influence in Syria and Iraq, Ankara has to make peace with its Kurdish minority. If autonomy is the way to resolve the Kurdish question in Iraq and Syria, the path to conflict resolution in Turkey is more federalism.

The AKP is in dialogue with PKK leader Öcalan, aiming for the disarmament of his organization. However, the pro-Kurdish BDP is not involved in the negotiations – unlike Sinn Fein in Northern Ireland – but is confronting the AKP's efforts to lift the immunity of ten of its parliamentarians for showing their approval of the PKK. Nonetheless, observers on both sides accept "(...) that the demands regarding political rights and Kurdish identity, such as the right to Kurdish-language education and greater degree of self-government, should also be addressed to reach a solution".⁸⁷ Meghan O'Sullivan urges "policy makers in the U.S. and Europe (...) to set aside their traditional way of viewing the world exclusively as a collection of nation-states; recognize the possibilities and risks behind Kurdish empowerment; and craft a strategy to encourage this pro-Western population to gain more influence in the region without provoking a backlash".⁸⁸ The PKK announced last September that it was "suspending pullout from Turkey into bases in northern Iraq, arguing Erdogan's government had not made good on promises to enact reforms to improve Kurdish rights"⁸⁹.

Only by guaranteeing equal rights to all its citizens can Turkey promulgate itself as a model

⁸⁶ Ömer Taspınar and Gönül Tol: "Turkey and the Kurds: From Predicament to Opportunity". Center on the United States and Turkey, Brookings Institution, *US-Europe Analysis Series Number 54*, 22 January 2014.

⁸⁷ Jake Hess: „Turkey's PKK Talks ". *Foreign Policy*, 8 January 2013.

⁸⁸ Meghan L. O'Sullivan: "Kurds May Lead the Way for the Arab Spring". *Bloomberg View Columns*, June 16, 2011.

⁸⁹ "Turkey unveils set of reforms, some aimed at reconciliation with Kurds". *Washington Post*, September 30, 2013.

in the Middle East with full support from Washington and Brussels. To promote the “Turkish model” in the Middle East, it must first guarantee democratic rights at home, including freedom of speech and the press, minority rights, and freedom of – and from – religion. In this regard, it still needs the West, one of the anchors of liberal democracy in Turkey. Yet, if the current course of action is maintained, it may well drag Turkey into turmoil and the kind of instability and polarization that could cause Turkey to look more like the post-Arab Spring Middle East than an inspiration for pluralist democracy, consensus-building, and tolerance. Indeed, it would be incorrect for the AKP leaders to believe in Turkey’s increasing international prominence and growing strategic independence from the West. In fact, Turkey’s economic and political ascent remains deeply contingent upon preserving its bonds with the Western world.

Today, many inside and outside of Turkey question whether it will remain the same successful democracy, open economy, and reliable security partner we have seen in recent years. There is cause for concern, but there is also time for the Turks to sort out the issues behind the Gezi Park demonstrations. Nonetheless, the AKP government is now on the offensive with a campaign of rhetorical abuse – and judicial action – against those participating in or supporting the demonstrations. Continued social unrest and the resulting questions about the nature of Turkish democracy will make the US-Turkish coordination more difficult. Thus, the US goal should be to do whatever is in its power to ensure that a complete and honest debate takes place in Turkey and to encourage the Turks to resolve the serious splits in their society in a democratic, peaceful manner. Assuming that Turkey remains a democratic system, continued partnership will be possible. Under the chaotic circumstances that reign in the region, this partnership will, in fact, remain essential in dealing with Syria.⁹⁰

Furthermore, Turkey’s relations with the Arab monarchies have been hurt by Ankara’s support for the ousted President Muhammad Morsi in Egypt and his Muslim Brotherhood.

“The neo-Ottoman foreign policy fell apart when the Syrian civil war intensified and the Egyptian army unseated the country’s elected president, Muhammad Morsi, an Islamist ally.”⁹¹

This has led to a growing sense of isolation from its Muslim neighbors and has caused Ankara to pivot its foreign policy to the United States and the EU. Ankara has once again turned to the West, seemingly considering Washington and Brussels as indispensable allies in containing Iran’s regional influence and protecting itself from the instability in Iraq and Syria. Thus, the regional landscape of the post-Arab Spring has upended many of Turkey’s regional ambitions.⁹²

In the meantime, the AKP has carried out a reversal in its foreign policy. In this change, its policies were brought into line with US positions on Iran and Syria. Consequently, Turkey decided to participate in “NATO’s twenty-first missile defense project”. The moderate Islamists seem to have realized the strategic assets of close ties to the US and “access to NATO technology” as an Islamic power in the Near East. Guaranteeing security in a region in uproar was the reason behind “Ankara’s foreign policy turnaround”.⁹³

The ambitious Turkish foreign policy from “the Adriatic to the Chinese Wall” met with resistance from the Arab Spring to the worsening of relations with Armenia. As the Arab popular uprisings brought to an end Turkey’s rapprochement with authoritarian regimes such as Egypt, Libya, and Syria, the Turkish government joined ranks with its Western allies to oust Mubarak, Gaddafi, and al-Assad. Nevertheless, the turn-around in foreign policy was greeted with satisfaction by the Arab street. The Cyprus issue, in contrast, is still a major obstacle to Turkey’s EU accession bid.

“But after years of strong growth and political reform, Turkey is sliding backwards, with more than a whiff of authoritarianism about the prime minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, whose Islamist-flavoured AK party has been in power since November 2002. If Mr Erdogan’s legal changes seriously under-

⁹⁰ James F. Jeffrey: “Where is Turkey Headed? Gezi Park, Taksim Square, and the Future of the Turkish Model”. Testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on European Affairs. July 31, 2013.

⁹¹ “Going Cold on Turkey. An internal power-struggle further dents Turkey’s hopes of joining the European Union”. *The Economist*, January 18, 2014.

⁹² Cagaptay: “Ankara’s Middle East Policy”.

⁹³ David Pollock and Soner Cagaptay: “What Happened to the ‘Turkish Model’?” *Fikra Forum*, January 7, 2013.

*mine judicial independence, the EU may suspend the talks. The enlargement commissioner, Stefan Füle, says Turkey should consult the EU before changing the judiciary's legal status. Perhaps the EU could help by opening chapter 23, on the judiciary and fundamental rights, and chapter 24, on justice, freedom and security.*⁹⁴

Of great concern to US legislators remains the reconciliation between Ankara and Yerevan; the Turkish-Armenian dialogue came to an abrupt end as the national parliaments of both countries refused to ratify the peace agreement mediated by the great powers, the US and Russia. With regard to the Syrian refugees, the AKP is dependent on humanitarian assistance from its allies. Without the installation of Patriot missiles from its Western partners, Turkey would not be able to protect its own territory from Syrian rockets. On the whole, Ankara has had to refashion its foreign policy to the new political realities in the region. Ultimately, the recent Turkish announcement that it would procure a missile-defense system from a Chinese company under US sanctions for its dealings with Iran has been a particularly surprising blow to Turkey's NATO allies.⁹⁵

VIII. Conclusion

George W. Bush spoke out in favor of the inclusion of Turkey into the EU. For Bush Jr. this country has served as a role model for an Islamic democracy and the EU accession would be in the interest of peace, as Turkey forms a "constructive bridge" between the West and the Islamic world. Additionally, the nation demonstrates that democracy is compatible with a "great religion such as Islam".⁹⁶

"A little more than a year after Obama addressed the Turkish Grand National Assembly, Washington seems caught between its attempts to advance this model partnership, and recognition of

*the reality that Ankara has moved on. In the abstract, Washington and Ankara do share the same goals: peace between Israel and the Palestinians; a stable, unified Iraq; an Iran without nuclear weapons; stability in Afghanistan; and a Western-oriented Syria.*⁹⁷

Turkey is a NATO country and plays a "very important role" in the Near East, and on these grounds the inclusion is in the EU's interest, Berlusconi explained. Turkey has been leading accession negotiations with the EU since 2005, though these have stalled. Only 14 of 35 negotiation chapters have already been opened. Further chapters are closed until Ankara allows EU member Cyprus to use its harbors and airports.⁹⁸

*"Mr. Erdogan said he was aware of resistance to Turkey's membership from some EU countries, but that Turkey paid them no attention. Mr. Erdogan's comments came a day after U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates said that if Turkey was drifting East, then the EU's resistance to Turkish membership in the 27-nation bloc was responsible for pushing the mainly Muslim nation away.*⁹⁹

According to Steven Cook, the West should not succumb to the temptation to ascribe the Islamization to a change of strategy in Turkish foreign policy. Foreign Minister Davutoğlu is the creative mind responsible for the new international activism, realizing the changing environment in Turkey after the Cold War. The ongoing rejection by the EU forced Turkey to exploit the unused economic opportunities to the South, East, and North of the country. Davutoğlu's thinking was dominated by the economy and not the Qur'an.¹⁰⁰

"It is hard to admit, but after six decades of strategic cooperation, Turkey and the United States are becoming strategic competitors – espe-

⁹⁴ "Going Cold on Turkey. An internal power-struggle further dents Turkey's hopes of joining the European Union". *The Economist*, January 18, 2014.

⁹⁵ "U.S. Concerned about Turkey's Choice of Chinese Missile System," *Reuters*, September 28, 2013.

⁹⁶ "Konstruktive Brücke: Bush will Türkei in der EU sehen". *Die Presse.com*, January 8, 2008. <http://www.die-presse.com/home/politik/aussenpolitik/353940/index.do>.

⁹⁷ *Ibid.*

⁹⁸ „EU: Berlusconi fordert rasche Aufnahme der Türkei“. *Die Presse.com*, November 13, 2008 <http://www.diepresse.com/home/politik/aussenpolitik/429899/index.do>.

⁹⁹ Marc Champion: "Turkey Is Committed to Western Ties, Erdogan Says". *Wall Street Journal*, June 11, 2010.

¹⁰⁰ Cook, "Frenemy" in Turkish?."

cially in the Middle East. This is the logical result of profound shifts in Turkish foreign and domestic politics and changes in the international system. Nowhere is Turkey asserting itself more than in the Middle East, where it has gone from a tepid observer to an influential player in eight short years."¹⁰¹

With the rapprochement with Iran and the Arab world, the Erdoğan administration responded to the wish of its Islamic and nationalist electorate for an 'Ottoman' and Eastern-oriented foreign policy. Turkey, an emerging country, intended to gain a certain reputation as mediator both in the West and among its neighbors. Its ultimate ambition was the promotion of the Turkish economy to the benefit of Islamic corporations. Ankara designed its diplomacy to relieve the mutual enmity and mistrust in a dangerous and crisis-torn region that had been plagued by war as well as religious and ethnic conflicts.¹⁰² "Turkey is returning to a more traditional role, one in which it was closely involved in the Middle East for centuries, going back to the Ottoman Empire," says Larrabee. He says the days when Turkey was a "junior partner" of the United States are over."¹⁰³

The Turkish multidimensional foreign policy has revitalized its relations with its neighboring states. Rather than standing passively at the sidelines and watching the events at its borders, Turkey took the initiative to exert its influence in the Mideast, in the Caucasus, and in Central Asia. The normalization of its relations with Armenia in particular appeared "revolutionary" in the stabilization of the Southern Caucasus.¹⁰⁴ Since 1993, both Turkey and Azerbaijan have been keeping their borders with Armenia closed. Ankara is urging Yerevan to give the occupied enclave Nagorno-Karabakh back to Baku. Both countries have no diplomatic relations with Armenia. However, the Armenian President Sarkissjan said in an interview with a Turkish newspaper that the Turkish recognition of the genocide of 1.8 million Armenians does not constitute a prerequisite for the amelioration of bilateral relations. The UN Commission on Human Rights

has classified the mass killings as genocide¹⁰⁵, while a ruling of the US Congress to declare Turkish atrocities against Armenians a genocide evoked Turkish resentment. Turkish and Armenian lawmakers have not ratified the peace agreement that the US, France, Russia, and Switzerland had brokered between the two nations, which is why relations between Ankara and Yerevan have cooled off.

*„Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has said that Turkey is one of seven rising powers with which the United States will actively collaborate to resolve global problems. Turkey hopes to be a global power, but it has not yet become even the regional player that the ruling AKP declares it to be.”*¹⁰⁶

In general, the Obama administration has avoided Turkish-US misunderstandings, and the stalled negotiations with EU facilitated the reconciliation: in any case, the US is no longer solely considering the geo-strategic importance of Turkey, but has realized the advantages of Ankara's good neighborly relations with the countries of the Near East and the Caucasus, demanding Turkish-Armenian dialogue and democratic reforms in Turkey. Therefore, the United States is insisting on the acceptance of secular Turkey as a member of the EU so that Islamic radicalism will lose its attraction. Nonetheless, the corruption probe in Turkey highlights the divergences in the bilateral relationship, as the Erdoğan administration brought forward accusations of "a vast conspiracy blaming everyone from Washington to Israel to US based Islamic cleric Fethullah Gülen for its woes". The AKP Prime Minister even considered "expelling the US ambassador to Ankara, Francis Ricciar-done"¹⁰⁷. Thus, Koplw contradicts the aforementioned positive assessment in so far as that "treading lightly with Turkey did not prevent Ankara from subverting the United States in the Middle East". He advises Washington to "institutionalize its new sterner approach to Turkey by making it clear to Ankara what its expectations are and ceasing its rhetoric on the strength of Turkish democracy, which has made it easier for American diplomats to fall

¹⁰¹ Ibid.

¹⁰² Mead, "Turkey Still Needs The West".

¹⁰³ Bernard Gwertzman and F. Stephen Larrabee: "Managing a More Assertive Turkey". *Interview at Council on Foreign Relations*, June 3, 2010.

¹⁰⁴ Cook, "Balancing a Bullish Turkey".

¹⁰⁵ "Türkei/Armenien". *Die Zeit*, September 6, 2008.

¹⁰⁶ Abramowitz and Barkey, "Turkey's Transformers".

¹⁰⁷ Jonathan Schanzer and Mark Dubowitz: "Iran's Turkish Gold Rush". *Foreign Policy*, December 26, 2013.

back on reality that has rapidly disappeared". In his critique, Koplow points out "that the US-Turkey relationship cannot be taken for granted, perhaps Turkey will see the value in being a reliable ally and actually become one"¹⁰⁸.

Following the rapid decline of the rule of law, international interest is waning. The EU and the US are highly concerned. Indeed, if European and US officials are permanently driven away by the Turkish state's provocative announcements of "strategic interest", why should they consider supporting a "volatile country" when their own publics "have become inward-looking"? Broadly speaking, the Turkish argument "depicting Turkey as a strategic addition to the EU has now largely vanished", argues Marc Pierini. In his view, the EU may "according to the accession negotiations' ground rules, state that Turkey's dismantling of fundamental freedoms, elimination of almost all key components of the separation of power, and authoritarian tendencies are not EU-compatible". Consequently, Brussels would in all likelihood choose to "suspend accession negotiations at the end of 2014 until the rule of law is restored". The former top European diplomat Pierini warns that "that would be the most logical scenario under the mutually agreed rules of the accession process".¹⁰⁹ In its *Report on Turkey*, the European Parliament (EP) strongly criticizes the dysfunctional rule of law, checks and balances, and separation of powers as well as the executive's intrusion into the judiciary by appointing the Supreme Board of Judges and Prosecutors (HSYK) and the infringements on media freedom by the administration's censorship and the self-censorship of media bosses.¹¹⁰

"Technically, as things stand now, it can be argued that the country no longer sufficiently fulfills the political criteria of the EU accession process. The visible trends on the Turkish political scene point to further degradation of the rule of law; greater controls on the judiciary, the press, and the citizens at large; more worries from financial circles; and a widening gap with EU standards. The

*artificial way the current crisis has been engineered makes it difficult to reconcile Turkey's domestic political games with its global interests, particularly vis-à-vis the EU."*¹¹¹

Considering the malfunctioning of the rule of law and the separation of powers, Turkey risks losing its self-acclaimed reputation as a land of opportunity for foreign investors in a country where they think twice before investing.¹¹² Erdoğan even "blamed an 'interest-rate lobby' for stoking the Gezi Park protests last summer". In contrast, President Gül "called for a 'new growth policy' and argued that Turkey should address its low savings rate, its educational failings, and the lack of women's participation in political and economic life".¹¹³ Yet anyone who cares about the future of the Western alliance with Turkey should not lose sight of ongoing trends that could potentially threaten the economic underpinning of Turkey's security – and with it the possibility of a stable and secure peace between Turkey and its neighbors. With the executive's tutelage of the judiciary, the harsh control of the Internet, a massively empowered intelligence service, Erdoğan's interference in central bank policies, self-censorship and the AKP's intrusion of the media, and the deterioration of civil rights, Turkey appears a hard sell on international markets. Turkey, addicted to international trade, investment, research and technology, as well as education and security, cannot afford a heavy fallout in diplomacy with its allies in the West.

Referring to the Gezi Park protests, Erdoğan has accused a coalition of "marginal groups, riff-raff, anarchists, terrorists and vandals" as well as followers of an influential US-based Islamic cleric and the opposition of stoking trouble on the streets to undermine him.¹¹⁴ In contrast, the EP report criticizes Turkey for "excessive violence" by the police against protesters in last summer's Gezi Park protests and the apparent failure of the courts to penalize all those state officials and policemen responsible for excessive violence, loss of life, and serious injuries to protesters; the report also expressed concerns over the polarization of the nation. The EP report severely con-

¹⁰⁸ Michael J. Koplow: "False Friends. Why the United States Is Getting Tough with Turkey". *Foreign Affairs* February 21, 2014.

¹⁰⁹ Marc Pierini: "How Far Backward is Turkey Sliding?" *Carnegie Europe*, March 3, 2014.

¹¹⁰ EPP Group: "Turkey: Most Critical Report Ever". March 12, 2014.

¹¹¹ Pierini.

¹¹² Paul Krugman: "Talking Troubled Turkey". *New York Times*, January 30, 2014.

¹¹³ Daniel Dombey: "Turkey. How Erdogan Did It – and Could Blow It". *Foreign Affairs* Jan./ Febr. 2014.

¹¹⁴ "Turkey's Transformation: Prospects and Limits". *Policy Watch* 2225, March 13, 2014.

demns Turkey's unwillingness to adhere to the Copenhagen criteria, which raises serious doubts and causes pessimism and scepticism about its commitment to further advance the EU accession bid process.¹¹⁵ "Turkey should reform not for the sake of the EU, but for the Turkish citizens that benefit the most by creating a modern and prosperous state," stressed Turkey rapporteur to the European Parliament, Ria Oomen-Ruijten.¹¹⁶

Without political progress, the passage of time will only create an environment in which social division intensifies, violence increases, investment is scared off, alienation grows, and the best and brightest leave to make their futures elsewhere. It is up to the leaders of the Turkish parties to make politics work toward the objective of advancing the democratization process and the alignment with the West. Both the Gezi Park protests as well as the corruption allegations are likely to turn the March 2014 local elections into a vote of confidence on the AKP government. Civil society should at this stage engage all parties in Turkey to provide a wider perspective and incentives for cooperation within a democratic regime. The stakes are great. Largely depending upon what they choose to do, the future of Turkey will either be that of a vicious circle or a virtuous one. I hope they make the right choice, and make it soon.

The AKP's authoritarian and contemptuous reaction to the Gezi protests and the corruption allegations has shifted Turkey's position away from a role model for the Arab Spring; this self-proclaimed reputation may have come to a definitive end. Turkey no longer presents a role model for the shape other new democracies in the Near East will take. A Turkey dominated by domestic polarization may not necessarily contribute to the stabilization of the turmoil in the Near East. Turkey's role as a barrier against the disorder

on its borders and a reliable partner for the West may become more questionable. Its ability to serve as a bastion of stability in the Greater Middle East seems to be diminished. By the same token, Turkey's status as an island of stability in a fragile region is no longer accurate.¹¹⁷ These issues pose the greatest dangers to Turkey and "the Middle East in three decades, and to regional stability, the survival of regimes, the security of the oil trade, and even the overall structure of US-led international security."¹¹⁷

In this regard, critics view this as a cause for serious concern, especially in view of the lack of alternatives. Indeed, on critical regional issues, Turkey and its allies have often worked at cross-purposes. Remedying this will require a steady effort to rebuild trust and communication and to find common policy ground on which Ankara and its allies can cooperate. For Ian Lesser of the German Marshall Fund, a transatlantic think-tank, Turkey now needs a 'zero problems' strategy with the West.¹¹⁸ Allies can bring new capabilities, insights, and funding to the table in ways that can reinforce Turkey's own efforts. This will require more determined action to advance the interests that Turkey and its partners share, but also more decisive steps to address the conflicts and problems roiling the region. The arena in which a more proactive policy is most urgently required – and would go the furthest to reassure allies and deter Iran – is Syria.

On the one hand, three years of turmoil in the Arab world should counsel smart, economical, and effective multilateral action, not serve as excuse for Western inaction; on the other hand, Prime Minister Erdoğan should consider the impact that his decisions have had on US and European interests in the region. Ultimately, Turkey need not act alone, and certainly should not unilaterally resort to military aid to extremist Syrian rebels.

¹¹⁵ EPP Group: "Turkey: Most Critical Report Ever". March 12, 2014.

¹¹⁶ Ibid.

¹¹⁷ Ali Çarkoğlu: "Turkey Goes to the Ballot Box: 2014 Municipal Elections and Beyond". Center on the United States and Europe at Brookings, Policy Paper Number 3, March 2014.

¹¹⁸ James F. Jeffrey: "Where is Turkey Headed? Gezi Park, Taksim Square, and the Future of the Turkish Model". Testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on European Affairs. July 31, 2013.

¹¹⁸ "Going Cold on Turkey".

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