Studie des Deutschen Orient-Instituts

Elections in Jordan and Morocco

Between ambitions and reality



Deutsche Orient-Stiftung/German Orient-Foundation
-Deutsches Orient-Institut/German Orient-Institute-
geçründet / founded by NUMOV 1960

Kronenstraße 1 • D - 10117 Berlin • Tel.: +49 (0)30 - 206410-21 • Fax: +49 (0)30 - 206410-29
www.deutsche-orient-stiftung.de • www.deutsches-orient-institut.de • doi@deutsches-orient-institut.de

Contents

Summary

- Jordan has held general elections on 20th September 2016. Albeit a new election law was passed beforehand, far-reaching change has not been the theme of this ballot. In a system almost devoid of political parties the Muslim Brotherhood's affiliates have garnered the most votes. A deterioration of the situation in neighbouring countries, as well as domestic setbacks, have taken a toll on the kingdom's reform process.

- Morocco's general elections on 7th October 2016 have re-affirmed the Justice and Development Party as strongest faction to head a coalition government. The Authenticity and Modernity Party, a watchdog established by the palace in 2008, became the second strongest faction. The parties' influence on politics is limited compared to the omnipotent powers of the monarch – and substantial change appears unlikely.

- Jordan and Morocco after protests emerged in 2011 have both undergone gradual reform processes including constitutional changes and now two general elections, respectively.

- The kingdoms seem to follow waves of liberalisation and de-liberalisation since 2011, blanketing a lack of substantial reforms.

Introduction

This study seeks to analyse the recent legislative elections in Jordan and Morocco. Accelerated, if not triggered, by the waves of protest since 2011, both states have seen political contestation followed by reforms with interesting trajectories. The 2016 ballots can be seen as a test of the state of this reform process. The following analysis will also attempt to unpack the framework of the elections – the constitutional role of parliament, electoral laws, party landscape, etc. – in order to locate their relevance.

Often seen as a harbinger of a meaningful process of democratisation, elections are looked at as a favourable mechanism. In both Jordan and Morocco, post-2011 reforms have emphasised the role of a parliament as the elected representation of the people's will. Within the gradual process of political reform, Abdullah II and Muhammad VI have stressed how democratic participation forms a key component of their respective kingdoms' futures. With these ambitions set, how do they test versus reality? In other words: including the constitutional framework as changed in 2011 in Jordan and Morocco, to what extent is parliament an influential institution within the political system? What powers does it possess and how do they relate to those of other branches? And with that in mind, what role has parliament played in recent years and how do the recent elections impact this?

In order to examine these questions, this study will first provide a condensed overview of the theoretical underpinnings and key literature relevant to this issue, namely democratisation theory. With this groundwork laid out, sections on Jordan and Morocco follow before a conclusion attempts to deduce overall results.

Reforms, Parliaments and Legislative Performance: Between Ambitions and Reality

Democratisation – as well as the connected topics of elections and the role of institutions – has been a major interest in the study of political developments in the Arab world. Guided by the question of when the region will lose its diagnosed exceptionalism – from the 'third wave'[1] to the 'Arab Spring' – many have investigated the prospects for Arab countries to become more democratic, pluralistic and participatory. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the subsequent democratisation of its former republics fuelled a 'demo-crazy'[2] environment in the study of Arab countries, often following the normative, almost teleological assumption that the region's states would give way to more democratic polities after all.[3] Seeing, as Francis Fukuyama famously coined it, the 'end of history'[4] looming, many reforms and changes were seen as first steps in a process of democratisation, eventually leaving more participatory systems and accountable governments.

During the 1990s and the early 2000s much of this euphoria was confronted by a reality in which policies that were perceived as democratising failed to bring about lasting, meaningful change. The resilience of the Arab world's incumbents thus became a major research focus: a combination of legitimation strategies, patronage and repression was most often identified. Indeed, the holding of elections was often controlled by restrictive party and electoral laws, gerrymandering, vote-buying and repression against the opposition and could thus only with great difficulty be seen as benchmark for democratisation. Many changes, after closer examination, were then seen as cosmetic ones at best, if not deceit.

Along these lines the study of political institutions under non-democratic rule arose in the 1990s as well. Long seen as aiding the erosion of the elites' grip onto power and thus fostering democratisation,[5] the role of institutions was later reassessed as allowing incumbents to manage power. Accordingly, differing from democratic polities, non-democratic elections and the legislative bodies determined by them have been analysed in three different ways. First, they can serve as a public display of unity and joint support for the incumbent. Second, they are viewed as means of patronage – creating, enlarging or reshaping networks for the distribution of material or immaterial gains – that allows the ruler to have those sympathetic to him rewarded and incentivise others to be lenient. Third, elections and legislatives can be seen as 'safety valves' – a means to channel and exhaust socio-economic or political pressure by offering avenues for discontent to be raised. Moreover, oppositional groups can be integrated into the system rather than having them fight it (co-optation).[6]

In this way, institutions such as parliaments have since been seen as ambivalent, much like the issue of democratic reforms at large: what had become a paradigm was then evaluated critically;[7] what was initially seen as a democratic opening was subsequently perceived as waves of liberalisation and deliberalisation.[8] Despite some euphoria amidst what was labelled the 'Arab Spring,' most analysts have stepped on the breaks regarding systemic change being an inevitable result in the countries of the region. With different states taking different trajectories – ranging from revolution to violent conflict – Jordan and Morocco have taken relatively similar paths. Indeed, be it by dissolving, banning or reintroducing parliament or holding early elections, relief can be achieved for those in power, as the mechanism of a 'safety valve' stresses. Rabat held

---

1 A term coined by Samuel Huntington. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies*, 1968.
2 Schlumberger, *Opening Old Bottles in Search of New Wine*, 2010, 233.
3 See for a critical assessment Anderson, *Searching Where the Light Shines*, 2006.
4 A term coined by Francis Fukuyama. Fukuyama, *The End of History?*, 1989.
5 Bunce, *Subversive Institutions*, 1999.
6 Which relates to the inclusion of actors like Islamists, causing the moderation of their positions. This phenomenon was examined, among others, by Asseburg, *Moderate Islamisten als Reformakteure*, 2007. This moderation-inclusion paradigm was challenged recently by Shadi Hamid and his analysis of the cases of Egypt and Jordan: Hamid, *Temptations of Power*, 2014.
7 Carothers, *The End of the Transition Paradigm*, 2002, 6-9.
8 Brumberg, *The Trap of Liberalized Autocracy*, 2002.

early general elections in late November 2011 and local and regional elections in September 2015. Jordanians, on the other hand, casted ballots in general elections in January 2013 and local elections in August 2013. Both kingdoms have recently held general elections, on 20th September 2016 in Jordan and 7th October 2016 in Morocco.

Overall, the region saw no year with fewer than half a dozen elections in the ten years prior to 2011, as Larbi Sadiki pointed out. Accordingly, the developments of what he called 'parliamentarisation' need to be understood while taking into account the interplay between the legislative frameworks and their practical impact. Sadiki identified this as a twofold process consisting of an institutional component (infrastructure, know-how) and the values established in this body (a legal-rational system, set of values).[9] This approach reflects that many such bodies in the region are rubber-stamp institutions that do not possess the capacity or power to function as a forum and decision-making body within the political system – especially when dealing with monarchies in which the king pulls the strings.

The following sections on Jordan and Morocco will attempt to analyse the recent elections and the legislative development in both countries. However, applying a standardised concept of parliamentary setup and performance, one that is informed if not defined by Western experience and practice, is not the goal of this study. Rather, it seeks to analyse the role, impact and performance of the respective legislatives by first consulting the primary source of their legitimacy: the constitution. How is the power of the parliament defined, how is it confined? Underpinning these questions, various other actors' views on the respective legislative bodies are taken into consideration as well. Embedding this in the overall reform process and discourse in both countries is ultimately the basis for evaluating and locating the role of both parliaments. The recent elections can in this regard be seen as new benchmarks in the context of the reform process since 2011.

[9] Sadiki, *Arab 'Parliamentarisation' in the Arab Spring context*, 18.

Jordan

Demands to tackle increasing prices as well as issues of social justice and political reform more consequentially were raised in Jordan in early 2011. Picking up some slogans and concerns from other Arab countries, different groups took it to the streets in order to urge the government to improve the socio-economic conditions of the Jordanians, as well as their political rights. These developments seemed negligible when compared with the revolutionary fervour in Tunisia and Egypt – in fact, the kingdom's domestic politics hardly made the headlines outside its borders – yet within its own context the number of protests, the breadth of actors involved and the scale of state responses was significant. Seldom was an overall change of the monarchical system demanded, while the calls for reforming the existing order prevailed, maybe best reflected by the adaption of the regional protests' prominent mantra "the people want the downfall of the regime" (al-sha'b yurīd isqāṭ al-niẓām) into "the people want to reform the system" (al-sha'b yurīd iṣlāḥ al-niẓām).

The initial period was characterised by a search for direction, however.[1] Various stakeholders and actors brought in different demands and proposals, ranging from the Muslim Brotherhood's political arm – the Islamic Action Front (IAF) – to loyalists, unions, professional syndicates and youth movements. King Abdullah II responded by establishing a committee to examine and draft changes to the kingdom's constitution – the recommendations were then adopted on 14th August 2011 by the monarch, changing a total of 42 paragraphs.[2] The majority of commentators praised them as important step, as a "beacon for truly democratic rule"[3] that would "establish a new political life in the kingdom,"[4] constitute a "political renaissance"[5] and allow Jordanians to "regain what seemed lost 50 years ago".[6]

Both the course of action and the content were criticised by some, however. As for the mode of implementation, critics mentioned the top-down approach of political reform – the monarch installed the committee and appointed its members before the recommendations were also approved and adopted by him. There was little room for inter-institutional debate let alone a public discussion. And also with regard to the content of the reforms, the IAF published a list of 35 paragraphs it would like to see changed, stating that "the constitutional amendments do not fully reflect the demands of the people."[7] And indeed, the changes were largely cosmetic.

The official reform discourse, meanwhile, aimed at two things. Firstly, over the previous years reform efforts largely focused on (socio-)economic measures. Steering the discourse in this direction has allowed the monarchy to engage in a number of reform packages with the goal of improving the living conditions of Jordanians by means of privatisation and encouraging new investments. This has, however, mainly aided an existing elite in maintaining if not expanding its significant influence on Jordan's economy.[8]

Secondly, once protests erupted in early 2011 the call for political reforms centred on the role – and potential improvement – of the country's political institutions, especially the Second Chamber and the government. Despite its subordinate constitutional role – the king pulls de facto all the strings – both the legislative body and the executive one of the cabinet were tasked with implementing changes as demanded by the people. Abdullah II publicly endorsed this approach, demanding a swift execution of democratic reforms.[9]

---

1 As an example, during the period from early 2011 to late 2012 government reshuffling saw its zenith, with the kingdom seeing five different prime ministers: Samir Rifai was replaced by Marouf al-Bakhit in Febru ary 2011, who was replaced by Awn Shawkat al-Khasawneh in October 2011, who was again replaced by Fayez al-Tarawneh in May 2012, who was replaced by Abdullah Ensour in October 2012. These person nel moves were due to the slow pace of change.

2 Among other changes: the dissolution of the House of Representatives now also entails the resignation of the government; the latter is no longer able to issue temporary laws unless Jordan is at war (the king can still issue royal decrees); an independent national commission is to oversee elections while the judiciary is to be the only branch to decide on contestations (under the electoral law) and possible trials of ministers; and the minimum age to run for the House of Representatives has been lowered to 25 years.

3 Al-Dustour, 15 August 2011, p. 1.

4 Ibid.

5 Wardem, *Constitutional amendments to become a means for a political renaissance*,2011.

6 Al-Khaytan, *Constitutional amendments... Jordanians regain what seemed lost 50 years ago*, 2011.

7 IAF, *The constitutional amendments do not fully reflect the demands of the people.*

8 Bank, *Jordan: Between Regime Survival and Economic Reform*, 2004.

9 Abdullah II, *At the meeting with heads and members of the executive, legislative and judicial authorities*, 2011.

Five years after constitutional changes were implemented, and three after ballots were cast in 2013, Jordan held parliamentary elections on 20th September 2016. For the first time since 2007 the IAF did not boycott the election and the electoral law was again changed, this time including lists. The following sections seek to address the outcomes of this ballot contextualised in the political reform process at large.

I. Regional politics, refugees and the main cleavages

Jordan is situated in a "less-than-ideal geography," as Curtis R. Ryan put it.[10] Historically focusing on the West – toward Israel and Palestine – it is now the North and the East reaching into the South that trouble Amman. The situation in Syria and Iraq has affected the kingdom greatly, as has the rise of the so-called Islamic State. Jordan, as strategic partner of the US and ally of the GCC states (particularly Saudi Arabia),[11] has quickly joined forces with others in fighting IS – an engagement that in late 2015 led to the capture and brutal murder of the Jordanian fighter pilot Muadh al-Kasasbeh.

A growing concern was also how these developments might permeate the kingdom's domestic political scene. Rare showings of solidarity with IS by Jordanians further increased the need for border security in order to confront a potential backlash. While this threat was not just imagined or perceived, but with chaos at Jordan's borders a real one, some of the measures arguably also aided the monarchy in pushing back calls for thorough (and near-term) reform in favour of a slower, gradual approach.[12] Tightening anti-terrorism and media legislation came with this development of securitisation, criticised by human rights groups as a move that, at least as a welcome side effect, also cracked down on reform movements and oppositional groups.

In that way, regional developments have taken a toll on reform efforts within the kingdom. The worsening situation in neighbouring Syria has begun to impact the kingdom domestically since late 2011. Indeed, refugees and migration is an issue familiar to Jordan: since 1948 and the subsequent confrontations with Israel, Jordan has taken in a huge number of Palestinians, who now, including their descendants, make up more than half of the country's population according to most estimates.[13] Since 2003 Jordan has also been hosting an additional number of people fleeing neighbouring Iraq.

As of September 2016, the kingdom hosts more than 650,000 Syrian refugees officially registered with the UNHCR.[14] Experts, however, have continued to emphasise that this number is higher in reality as close relations between Jordanian and Syrian societies meant that not everybody was forced to register officially, some instead finding hosts in family members or the like. Accordingly, Jordan's last census put the number at 1.265 million Syrian nationals in the country.[15] At the same time, Jordan also has an interest in high estimates since international donor money depends on them. The actual number probably lies somewhere between the two figures.

The influx of refugees has put pressure on Jordan in many ways: already scarce water supplies are being exhausted at an even faster pace, as are other resources. Similarly, the kingdom's labour market has been impacted too, posing issues such as the permissibility of Syrians to work in Jordan and compete with Jordanians despite unemployment having been an issue over the past years, with a growth in the informal sector a likely result. This hampers efforts to foster transparency and fight corruption. Ensuring that children are able to go to school and receive a proper education is another challenge that will continue to grow as long as international aid remains insufficient. Due to the aforementioned close relations between Jordanians and Syrians, the majority of refugees lives within the country's urban centres, aggravating pre-existing issues there – nevertheless, Jordanians have met refugees with admirable hospitality.

Several key areas have been impacted in Jordan's economy beyond its labour market and resource scarcity. Syria was a main regional trading partner for Jordan, the loss of which affects some of its export businesses. At the same time, imports rose significantly in order to cater to the needs of the changed new situation, enhancing the kingdom's trade deficit. Living prices and conditions have also changed rapidly: prices for basic goods and housing have risen dramatically, especially in urban areas, leading to a growing inflation.

[10] Ryan, *Jordan in the crossfire of Middle East conflicts*, 2015, 42.
[11] Jordan has, however, also maintained balanced relations with Russia and reapproached Iran lately.
[12] See van den Woldenberg, *Regionale Bedrohung als Vorwand für zunehmende Repression*, 2014.
[13] A reliable official number is not available since the issue is highly politicised.
[14] The figures are provided by the UNHCR: http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/country.php?id=107.
[15] Ghazal, *Population stands at around 9.5 million, including 2.9 million guests*, 2016.

One main cleavage has permeated the kingdom's politics for decades: (Trans-)Jordanians vs. Jordanians of Palestinian descent. As mentioned above, since 1948 a large number of Palestinians have fled to Jordan. While official statistics of this highly politicised issue are not available, most estimates have the number of people of Palestinian descent at more than half of the kingdom's population. And indeed, this issue has been a dominant factor for Jordanian politics in many ways. Electoral laws have attempted to account for the geographical distribution of these two groups – with Palestinians being concentrated in urban areas – by ensuring a disproportionate representation of rural constituencies in the legislative. At times, a rural vote was worth seven times more than one in Amman or other cities in the kingdom's north when comparing the ratio of inhabitants per seat.

This narrative has also played a key role in the reform efforts and how these were perceived among the country's elite. Ethnic Jordanians have historically been seen as the monarchy's backbone, overrepresented in civil service and security forces and, as mentioned earlier, in the electoral system. Economic reforms over the past decades, however, have favoured the Palestinian-dominated private over the public sector, shifting some influence. When discussing political reforms, liberalisations are also viewed through this prism, as more participation would likely strengthen Palestinians – among others also via the IAF, a party dominated by Palestinians.

With the share of youth growing, new challenges arose for the monarchy, leading to the foundation of new movements and internal changes to existing ones. Similarly to the situation in other states in the region, Jordan's population also exhibits a high number of under 30 year olds. A considerable share of them enters the labour market every year, not few well-educated, with the kingdom's economy struggling to accommodate them. The level of frustration resulting from this (among other factors) has led some youth to engage politically over the recent years.

Two examples showcase this, in particular keeping the cleavage between ethnic Jordanians and Palestinians in mind: first, a new movement named Ḥirāk emerged after the protests in 2011. This label covers an amorphous number of smaller local initiatives that mushroomed across Jordan. They are united in their demands for an improvement of the socio-economic situation yet what distinguishes this group is that it consists almost entirely of tribal youth – the segment of the population mostly seen as loyal to the monarchy.

The second example stresses how existing movements were impacted. The Muslim Brotherhood has seen tumultuous years, with mounting internal divisions between falcons and doves resulting in the break-away of the Zamzam Movement, joined by (relatively) young MB members. The monarchy played its part by officially recognising the new group – the old MB was never official.[16]

II. Electing the legislative: the ever-changing electoral law post-2011

II.1 The 2012 election law and the election in January 2013

The 2012 Jordanian electoral system was a complicated one, attempting to combine different elements. It was divided into two majority-plurality systems, which provided seats for three groups of minorities, a women's quota and a national district list of proportional representation. The Parliament, or Chamber of Deputies (CoD), was elected through the 'single non-transferable system' (SNTV) from 1993 to 2007.[17]

The main effort of the 2012 election law was the introduction of a second vote option. Still not adopting full proportional representation, this signified little progress. Even though the 2012 election law provided a national list, only 27 out of 150 seats in the parliament are elected through proportional representation. And although there were 22 lists, none of them obtained more than three seats, while most did not even win one seat in parliament, while even the stability of the lists has been vague. Following the introduction of the SNTV system in 1993 the

[16] Bondokji, *The Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan: Time to Reform*, 2015.

[17] SNTV represents one-person, one-vote. According to the definition by organisation aceproject: "under SNTV, each voter casts one vote for a candidate but there is more than one seat to be filled in each elec toral district. Those candidates with the highest vote totals fill these positions. SNTV can face political par ties with a challenge. In, for example, a four-member district, a candidate with just over 20% of the vote is guaranteed election. A party with 50% of the vote could thus expect to win two seats in a four-member dis trict. If each candidate polls 25%, this will happen. If, however, one candidate polls 40% and the other 10%, the second candidate may not be elected. If the party puts up three candidates, the danger of 'vote-split ting' makes it even less likely that the party will win two seats." See www.aceproject.org.

districts were represented with several seats each (until 2007), whereas since the new electoral law came into effect in June 2012 the districts of the Jordan governorates are now divided into 42 election districts, with each allocated between one and seven seats. However, these districts are neither geographically nor demographically ordered, and SNTV, which mainly curtails the opposition,[18] remains in place. Every subdistrict is able to get one seat, meaning that even if the voter elected his or her chosen candidate in one of the lists, that candidate might not end up representing that subdistrict.[19]

As in other parliaments, Jordan is used to having a women's quota. Beginning in 2003 the quota covered six seats, a total of just 5.5%. In 2010 the quota was set to 12 seats, which doubled the percentage to 10%, and in 2012 it was raised to 15 seats (out of 150 – also representing 10%). There are two ways a woman can win a seat in parliament. On the one hand she could get enough votes to be the direct candidate of her district, or on the other hand she could benefit from the "Best Loser System" (BLS) by being the female candidate to receive the majority of votes in her electoral district.[20]

The Chamber of Deputies provided 150 seats for the 23rd January 2013 election: 123 majoritarian seats and 27 seats for the newly introduced national list of proportional representation. Jordan has twelve governorates, which since 2010 comprise 42 electoral districts providing between one and seven parliamentary seats as well as another three Bedouin districts, each with three seats. This total of 45 electoral districts brought up the 123 majoritarian seats, of which 15 were reserved for women and 108 through the SNTV system, namely the first-past-the-post system.[21] Those 108 seats were subdivided into 96 reserved for ethno-religious groups, with nine seats for Christian candidates, three seats for Circassians or Chechen candidates, as well as 87 for Muslim candidates. In addition there are the nine Bedouin seats from the districts in Badia.

The Muslim Centre Party 'al-Wasat' won three seats through the list and 13 representatives through direct votes.[22] It has thereby become the most powerful faction in a parliament, with predominant single players and the IAF boycotting the ballot. The election in 2013 after all showed up not only with a new law, but also with old problems like missing transparency, a lack of electoral intelligence and the absence of equality, seen in the high influence of several stakeholders such as the secret service and high-ranking officials. Even the election results showed that nothing visible has changed, as just a few new representatives have been elected into the new parliament. Everything else just stayed the same, such as the structural function and its influence on the political process. Summarising the change in the 2012 election law, one can see the elevation from 128 to 150 seats in parliament, the increase in the women's quota from 12 to 15 seats and the introduction of a second vote for a national list of proportional representation.

II.2 Changes prior to 2016 election

The law was approved by the parliament on 9th March 2016 and issued by royal decree four days later. The differences between the Election Law of 2012 and the new Election Law released for the parliamentary elections in 2016 can be recognised mainly in three changes to the electoral programme; the allocation of seats (Art.8), the electoral districts (Art.8) and the removal of the SNTV for a Proportional Open List System (Art. 9).[23] In addition, the government made some alterations in the electoral process, for instance the voters' registration.[24]

Compared with the election law of 2012 many points changed in the 2015 version. First and foremost the long-criticised SNTV system was abandoned as of the parliamentary elections in 2016, at least for the moment. Furthermore, the number of seats in parliament has been reduced from 150 to 130 (Art.8). The new law now provides 115 seats for the constituencies and another 15 seats to fulfil the women's quota,

[18] Due to this fact, the IAF boycotted the elections in 2010 and 2013 and demanded reform.
[19] c.f. *Assessment of the Electoral Framework*, 2013.
[20] Ibid.
[21] As defined by organisation aceproject: "The First Past The Post system is the simplest form of plural ity/majority system, using single member districts and candidate-centered voting. The voter is presented with the names of the nominated candidates and votes by choosing one, and only one, of them. The win ning candidate is simply the person who wins the most votes, in theory he or she could be elected with two votes, if every other candidate only secured a single vote." See www.aceproject.org.
[22] See Ryan, *Jordan's unfinished Journey: Parliamentary Elections and the State of Reform*, 2013.
[23] Law on the Election of the House of Representatives, Law No. 6 of 2016.
[24] For this year's election there has been an automatic voter registration in contrast to the previous elections, where voters had to be registered before the polls. Every 18 year old with a Jordanian passport has been automatically registered.

with one seat per governorate, meaning that each has at least one female representative.

The 2015 bill divided the kingdom into 23 electoral districts, one for each of the 12 governorates in addition to the urban governorates: Amman, which is split into five districts; Irbid, into four districts; and Zarqa, into two districts. On top of this are the three governorates of Badia. Each district of the desert region of Badia is treated as a governorate: North, Centre and South.[25] In the elections in 2013 there were 15 governorates but 45 electoral districts.

The "one-person, one-vote" Electoral System, known as SNTV, has been removed for a Proportional Open List System (POLS) (Art. 9). One list must include at least three candidates and should not include more names than there are seats for the district. Female representatives are not included in the maximum of list candidates. The voting is based on the system that each voter shall only pick one of the nominated lists, and has then to choose one or more candidates from the list (Art. 9 C).[26]

With regard to the criteria for voters and candidates there was no mandatory change to the election law in 2013. One interesting fact about voter criteria is that citizens can only vote if they were already 18 years old 90 days before the announced election day. This represents a measurable change in youth participation in parliamentary elections, as does the change in passive electoral rights in 2011, which lowered the minimum age to 25.[27]

II.3 The election law for the 2016 ballot

Economic deficits and security doubts led King Abdullah to dissolve parliament on 29th May 2016, naming Hani al-Mulqi as interim prime minister up to 1st June and ´bring the elections forward from 2017 to the 20th September 2016. The Independent Election Commission of Jordan (IEC)[28] had fewer than four months to prepare the administrative and legal requirements of a parliamentary election.

The 2015 election law featured a constitutional court, an independent election commission and increased subsidiarity through the decentralisation of constitutional laws. The government announced that the main arguments of opposition had thereby been allayed, especially the abolishment of the SNTV system after 26 years.

Indeed, some observers compared the new election law to that of the initial parliamentary revival in 1989, the reintroduction of which has been the demand of opposition groups. Given that the 1989 law is a model that has actually been applied in practice, the idea of reintroducing this system is not far-fetched, but it has widely been seen as a deal-breaking criterion for the regime as it could expand the influence of the Muslim Brotherhood and its IAF – in 1989 this system allowed them to garner more votes than expected.[29] However, the new law can be seen as a mixture of the 1989 and the 2013 law, for instance the system of casting votes on a ballot for as many representatives as are registered in the district plus the national list mixes features from both. Nevertheless, there are other changes, like the cutting of 20 parliamentary seats from 150 to 130. The main effort of the new election law was meant to be to reduce the gerrymandering of districts by adjusting the seats in the urban areas, i.e. Amman (now 28, previously 25), Irbid (now 19, previously 17) and Zarqa (now 12, previously 11), but these changes are mere consolation in relation to the proportion of inhabitants.[30] The arrangement for under-represented groups, such as the women's quota, stayed the same. Even if the representation in the amount of seats drops, the proportion of female parliamentarians should increase.

For the election there were 1,252 candidates on 226 lists, of which 39% were independent, 43% affiliated to tribal ties and only a mere 6% connected to a political party.[31] Voter participation in the election stood at about 37%.[32] The National Coalition for Reform, which won only 15 seats out of 130, is the strongest party

[25] Law on the Election of the House of Representatives, Law No. 6 of 2016, Article 8C.
[26] Ibid, Article 9C.
[27] Abdullah II, *On the occasion of presenting the suggested constitutional amendments by the Royal Committee on Constitutional Review*, 2011.
[28] IEC is the Independent Election Commission of Jordan.
[29] A problem with the 1989 law was that voters could have as many votes as there were candidates for the ballots. Therefore, the parliament was indeed diversified and the oppositional influence, consisting of na tionalist, Islamist and secular leftist parties, took more than half of the seats. There may be no need to mention that the king was not amused about this.
[30] Wehler-Schoeck, *Parliamentary Elections in Jordan*, 2016.
[31] See IRI, the International Republican Institute.
[32] IEC results of the parliamentary election: Registered Voters: 4,139,612; Cast Votes: 1,490,200; Valid Votes: 1,278,723; Invalid Votes: 24,126.

in the Jordanian parliament.[33] Therefore, the CoD does not consist of any established fraction, but rather short-lived alliances on specific topics. It was noticeable that voters' choices influenced by non-ideological criteria did not change in the 2016 elections.

The 2015 election law has been declared a historical step for Jordan's parliament, but it is hard to say whether it can really be considered as such. If the law outlasts the next election, people may gain trust in a genuinely reformed parliament and therefore may change their voting habits, or rather the establishment of parties could have a basement in the political environment of Jordan. However, the discussion about the long-term effects of this law are currently mere fortune telling. Theoretically, the next parliamentary elections in Jordan will take place after a legislative period of four years. Admittedly, the probability that the elections take place in 2020, after a whole legislative period for the first time since 1993, can be estimated at more than marginal.

II.4 Critics

As already has been mentioned, the introduction of SNTV curtailed the opposition in Jordan's parliament. The SNTV systems just encourage voters choices to be centred on specific directions, right along familiar clans and tribes, as well as loyalism to the king, at the same time keeping down the opposition and preventing the emergence of serious political parties. This permits on the one hand an overrepresentation of certain districts, namely those in the eastern part of Jordan, where conservative and pro-regime-orientated tribes live, while there is on the other hand a lack of representation in urban areas with more educated inhabitants and a bigger proportion of Palestinian-origin population. For example, in the desert region of Badia one can clearly see this kind of overrepresentation in specific electoral districts. Badia is divided into Northern, Central and South Badia, with a total of nine seats in Parliament despite there being a population of only 143,178 registered voters. This strikes a discord with more urban districts, like for example election district number four in the governorate of Amman, where only three seats are given on a total of 127,986 registered voters.[34] So if we now focus on the question as to whether the 2015 election law is still gerrymandering after abolishing the SNTV system, well, yes it is. In comparison with rural Jordan, urban Jordan is still underrepresented.[35] Although an adjustment of electoral districts did take place, the cut on parliamentary seats, which still provide neither geographic nor demographic order, means that the election law of 2015 still forces gerrymandering and tactical voting. Moreover, with the introduction of the POLS system even more points of discussion arise. First of all, how effective are lists in a country without serious parties? The landscape of political parties in Jordan is only growing incrementally, and on the election lists only 6% represent political parties.[36] The problem created by the lack of serious parties is that only local interests are brought into focus by single-player parliamentarians. The idea to work on a "whole-Jordan-covered" concept does not exist. Since there are only vague lists and no party with a fully differentiated programme, and neither does a national concept exist that could improve work on specific or particular topics, parliament is not working in Jordan's interest. It is instead focussed on local belongings, and progress will be hard to earn. But is that perhaps what the royal house wants? An ineffective parliament will not improve citizens' political participation, and apathy among voters would probably stay the same, meaning that the royal plan for votes to be cast along traditional faultlines may continue to succeed. The second problem for POLS is that since the stability of lists in Jordan could be rated as vague, most of them will probably not even exist by the next election. So the all-embracing question is: can the POLS system really deliver progress in the functionality and effectivity of the Jordan parliament, and can serious results be expected? This answer, as already suggested, may only come during the current legislative period in the Jordanian parliament.

The 2016 law has been described as a step in the direction of liberalisation in Jordan since the opposition declared the introduction of the SNTV system as deliberalisation, but can it really already be seen like that?

An analysis of parliamentary elections in Jordan needs to focus not only on the legal framework and political outcome, but also take a closer look at electoral process and public discourse regarding the polls. As the International Republican Institute (IRI) has reported, there has

[33] Ibid.
[34] Democracy Reporting International / The Identity Center, *Assessment of the Electoral Framework*, 2013.
[35] While the number of voters in Badia according to seats in parliament stayed the same even after the ad justment, in the second district of Amman more than 400,000 voters still only elected candidates to six seats.
[36] According to IRI.

been much criticism of the IEC and Jordanian media for failing to adequately educate the population about the upcoming election, only doing so shortly before election day. Candidates lamented that voters should have been helped to better understand the new voting system, particularly since its introduction has been acclaimed as historical step. They only had four months to arrange the electoral process, but given all the technological possibilities of the 21st century, the time could have been used more effectively.[37] Due to the small numbers of those registering, the voter registration deadline was extended for an hour by the independent election commission. During the election day some incidents were reported, like the disappearance of ballot boxes,[38] but all in all there were no riots or boycotts as in years before.

Since 1989 Jordan has seen as many new election laws as there have been elections. So if we talk about the habits of Jordanian voters, how does such an endless debate about electoral system, democracy and the role of parliament effect people's choice in political participation? The personal choice of who to give one's vote is difficult to define because the actual election choice often depends more on personal than political reasons, along tribal affiliations more than genuine content. However, a serious deficit of political interest and the previously mentioned poor comprehension of the electoral framework are further reasons. Another point is that the majority of Jordanians do not feel comfortable with parties, as these were forbidden from 1956 to 1991 and everyone who participated politically could get into serious problems.[39] The question occurring here is why this did not improve in the last 25 years? The simple answer may be that the previous electoral system prioritised the suppression of political participation and non-development of serious political parties. However, one can see the parliamentarian as the 'service provider,'[40] guaranteeing the voter their own profit from electing him or her [41]

This brings us to corruption and elections. Article 24 of the election law[42] prohibits any form of voter manipulation, such as bribery. But since corruption and patronage are no blank page in Jordan, parliamentary elections are concerned with cases of illegal vote catching. Prior to the election day on 20th September, the IEC discovered about 200 documented financial or political contributions. It remained unclear whether all of these cases were punished before the election and whether therefore all possible corrupt candidates had been eliminated, because once voted to parliament candidates enjoy full immunity. This lenient prosecution hardly bolsters the voters' trust in the parliamentary election,[43] even if moderate progress in fraud detection has been noted. In addition, some candidates suspect some IEC commissioners to be linked to this or simply incompetent in their positions.[44]

As the quotas for women and minorities stayed the same, the critics thereof as well as the points raised remained unanswered. A problem with the quota system in a technical sense is that without it women or minorities are rarely elected into the parliament as direct candidates. Reproaches are addressed to the fact that only five women were able to win seats besides through the quota, and more precisely that women have only been mentioned on lists to win a seat through the quota.[45] It is also nota-

[37] Ibid.

[38] IEC President Khaled Kalaldeh confirmed that 17 ballot boxes went astray after unknown people entered an election centre in Central Badia. Out of them, ten ballot boxes were intact, another was found to be tampered with but could have been reconstructed, four boxes were destroyed and one was still missing, while the latter five were invalidated by the IEC. C.f. Azzeh, *Preliminary election results announced, legislature makeup takes shape*, 2016.

[39] Gebhard, *Wahlen zum 17. Abgeordnetenhaus in Jordanien*, 2013.

[40] Wehler-Schoeck, *Jordanien nach den Wahlen*, 2013.

[41] This strategy could be seen in this year's electoral campaign. As several media sources have reported, Jordanian cities were, in addition to the traditional campaigning tents, overflowing with election posters that showed only candidates or their names, instead of lists or parties.

[42] Law on the Election of the House of Representatives, Law No. 6 of 2016, Article 24.

[43] As Jordan citizen Ahmad Quran stated in an interview with al-Jazeera: "They should just appoint MPs and stop this show called election. Prices of food and taxes have been soaring while the corrupt are stealing from us. What did the parliament do to hold them accountable?" C.f. Abuqudairi, *Can Jordan's new parliament spear head political change? Despite the Islamists' comeback to parliament, 'no radical changes' are expected*, 2016.

[44] The reality of an 'independent' commission in Jordan can be challenged as well. Perhaps the IEC forced institutions to assume responsibility for voter intelligence, especially in comparison with NGOs with less financial possibilities, meaning that the IEC could control who to inform and who not, and whether to give them a platform for critics on the new law.

[45] In comparison to the women's quota in other Arab states, Jordan is not pioneering. For example Iraq has a female quota of 26.5%.

ble that the quota also provides one seat per governorate and not per district, also for minorities such as Christians, Chechens and Circassians. However, that is not what was originally intended with the quota – or was that the actual intention? Considering the numbers of refugees living in Jordan, who in the long term should be integrated into the quota system, its effectiveness has been doubted, as the presence and lack of political integration of Jordanians of Palestinian descent suggests.

Behind the steady change of the election law there is more arbitrariness than coincidence. To put it simply, the new system is same as the old way to encourage voters to make their decisions according to loyalist and tribally affiliated structures. Even if Jordan might be on the right track towards a more liberal, democratic and even civil state, this path will be long and is not yet certain to succeed.

III. The 18th parliamentary elections on 20th September 2016

Jordan's political landscape lacks parties with a serious political framework. Due to this, expectations concerning the elections have varied. On the one hand there are the former Muslim Brotherhood affiliated groups like the IAF or the Zamzam movement, while on the other there are several small groups with common interests and ideas for Jordan's future. The election results were predicted to favour the Islamist parties, which indeed came to pass, but not to the extent that was originally thought.[46] The following paragraph outlines the largest fractions within Jordan's new parliament.

The Islamic Centre Party, al wasat, is a centrist Islamic-orientated Party, the largest Islamic party other than the IAF, describing itself as the most moderate. Since its foundation in 2001, the al-wasat party has won seats in communal elections. It demands democratisation and greater political participation for women. While they won 16 seats in the parliamentary elections 2013 – probably because of the boycott on part of the Muslim Brotherhood – and became the largest fraction in the 17th parliament, they only won five seats in the election on 20th September.

Meanwhile, the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood[47] is divided into several groups, it's most well known being the Islamic Action Front (IAF). Having boycotted the last two parliamentary elections, those in 2010 and 2013, they lined up for the elections in 2016 under the National Coalition for Reform, which won 15 seats and is therefore the largest party in the Jordanian parliament. This new coalition represents several groups of Jordan's population, including Christian candidates, Jordanians of Circassian and Chechen origins, women and especially the youth. The speaker of the IAF's higher election commission Zaki Bani Rsheid confirmed that the list should not only exist for the upcoming elections, but guarantee stability for cooperation in parliament as well. It remains to be seen whether the members of the list will fulfil their purpose to initiate political, economic and social reform. The IAF's listing of women and Christians further shows its distinct turn to "pluralism" as a central message of its campaign.[48] For this reason the programme of the NCR refrains from Muslim Brotherhood and IAF quotes such as "Islam is the solution", leading to a civil, non-religious union to face Jordan's problems.[49] The IAF has been on 20 national lists with the NCR, including representatives from other political parties and tribes, five Christians contesting the Christian seats, four candidates for the Circassian and Chechen seats, and 19 women. Rantawi explains the campaigning of the IAF aims at joining the parliament as a successful union, re-legitimising themselves but antagonising prejudices against Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan.[50]

The Zamzam movement introduced itself in 2013 as a union of former Muslim Brotherhood activists demanding fundamental changes, and even asked for non-Muslim Brotherhood participants to join them. Currently the movement has separated itself from the IAF and proposed its own list of candidates for the 2016 parliamentary elections as the National Congress Party Zamzam, providing 20 candidates.[51] Through the list and their direct candidates they won five seats in parliament and are therefore among the top three fractions.

---

[46] According to the high amount of 119 candidates on several lists, as well as their participation after two boy cotts, the results of the IAF affiliated group has been expected more.
[47] The Muslim Brotherhood, de jure actual not existing in Jordan, has once more been banned in April, by clos ing down their offices through the government.
[48] Malkawi, *IAF running on 20 'national' lists in elections — official*, 2016.
[49] Al Sharif, *Who are the winners and losers in Jordan's latest elections?*, 2016.
[50] Oraib Rantawi, Director of the Quds Center for Political Studies in Amman, c.f. Magid, *ANALYSIS: Jor dan's Muslim Brotherhood comes in from the cold*, 2016.
[51] Wehler-Schoeck, *Parliamentary Elections in Jordan*, 2016.

Meanwhile, the National Current Party won four seats, and the Justice and Reform Party won two. The Baath, Communist, National Union and Al Awn parties obtained one seat each. Secular leftist and national parties were once major players in Jordan's parliament, but did not manage to play a significant part in this year's election.[52]

One small surprise has been the 'ma'an' list, which is Arabic and means 'together'. As a relatively young coalition they have won two seats in the new Jordanian parliament. The basic idea behind the list has been common demands, for instance the transformation of Jordan into a civil state. Qais Zayadin, one of the new parliament members for the Ma'an List, announced that there should be no difference between origins, regardless of one's confessional or ethnic relationship with the state, that Jordan is in need of constitutional legality and that the list will use its opportunity to participate in the parliament, i.e. confirm itself as a political party.[53]

Since there is de facto no existing party programme offered by any party, all of them are campaigning for political reforms and democratisation. However, their durability and political progress has yet to be observed; it still remains unknown what will happen to the parliament in this legislative period, especially concerning the issues Jordan is currently facing.

IV. Jordan's elections: a benchmark for the country's political reforms?

The different factors that put pressure on Jordan's political and economic system, as outlined above, will continue to take their toll on the country's reform path. Soft-pedalling initially hopeful and further-reaching demands has been a theme to the protests in Jordan, as have the monarchy's cosmetic responses. Security concerns, whether they resemble real threats or exaggerated ones, have come to dominate the discourse and arguably led to an increasing polarisation of Jordanian society. Indicative of this was a recent incident that has shaken the kingdom: the killing of Nahed Hattar. A well-known and at times controversial author, he shared on Facebook a cartoon that some felt offended by, ridiculing the so-called Islamic State. Hattar was indicted for insulting Islam and on his way to appear in court he was shot dead. Hattar has been controversial with his views before, and he had received threats, none of which sufficed for the authorities to protect him. In fact, he was publicly denounced for sharing (he did not draw it) said cartoon before his assassination – of course, afterwards, the authorities were full of condemnation for the perpetrator. The incident triggered reactions across the region and among many around the globe. Those avowing for an open and pluralistic society that accepts such satire were shocked and blamed a multitude of actors for an atmosphere that eventually resulted in the death of Hattar.

The period immediately following the elections has proven interesting with regards to the parliament. In the formation of the new cabinet, Prime Minister Hani al-Mulqi has refrained from including a number of members of the Senate, as had been custom in the kingdom's history, while at the same time a wider personnel shuffle included the replacement of the Chief of Staff, among other higher functionaries. The first parliamentary session was set (as per the constitution) to be held on the first day of October, although Abdullah II postponed it per royal decree (also within his constitutional rights) until 7th November. There are some analysts speculating as to what motivated this decision, some of them arguing that the new al-Mulqi government is set to push through unpopular decisions.[54]

One of these issues could very well be a planned gas deal with Israel. Since first under debate, such a deal was fiercely criticised as buying 'stolen' or 'Zionist' gas. Parliamentary discussions were heated and representatives of Palestinian descent were particularly offended by the idea of finalising such a deal with Israel. Parliament would have to agree to such a deal, but it seems as if an open debate is not something the monarchy or the government welcome. Postponing the first parliamentary session may therefore have been motivated by an attempt to avoid heated debate. Such a move underpins the parliament's role vis-à-vis the executive. At the same time, however, it also hints at the executive trying to avoid parliamentary discussion, perhaps because it is more than a rubber-stamp institution and provides a forum for societal debate.

[52] See Wehler-Schoeck, *Jordanien nach den Wahlen*, 2013.
[53] Interview with Qais Zayadin, *Länderbericht Konrad Adenauer Stiftung*, 2016.
[54] See e.g. Badareen, *The night of toppled veteran Senators in Jordan*, 2016.

Morocco

The events triggered by the so-called 'Arab Spring' in Morocco have greatly influenced discourse on the kingdom's political system and are central to recent developments. Large protests resulted in a constitutional referendum and early elections, yielding a victory for the Justice and Development Party (PJD) in 2011. Since then – even though reform demands have hardly been met – the proactive reaction of the monarchy has stolen the movement's thunder.

Did Morocco move towards a more pluralistic, participatory and maybe democratic polity? The nature of the regime has not changed as considerably as the added word in the constitution suggests: a "parliamentary monarchy" instead of a "constitutional, democratic and social monarchy."[1] Traditionally, King Muhammad VI has been perceived as key to the kingdom's resilience, inheriting a certain toolbox of ways to maintain control from his late father Hassan II,[2] and ensure a societal balance. The demands raised in 2011, however, called this perception into question in that they revolved around improving socio-economic conditions and the political system as well as intensifying the fight against corruption and nepotism. The latter calls were particularly critical of the established political class and their connections to the palace (a complex often called 'Makhzen'), seemingly prioritising personal gains.

The kingdom has conducted elections from 1962 to the present day, suggesting a more or less 'democracy-like' tradition despite the people's strong loyalty to the king's 'sacred power.' A multitude of political parties have also been around for an extended period of time. The institution of the parliament, however, is limited in its constitutional powers compared to the executive authority of the monarch.

Were the expectations of Moroccans met? Do the new constitution, reforms and the 2011 elections only signify a cosmetic victory? Many hoped in 2011 that the vote results would not impede the process, but that they would be the beginning of a more thorough one. Parts of the population seemed satisfied enough, however, to refrain from continuing to raise their discontent publicly – the number of large demonstrations declined. Moreover, with the PJD government in place, demands were directed at this body rather than others, confronting the PJD with tough choices and unpopular decisions. To some extent the situation in Morocco is an "awkward combination of moderate civil liberties and continued political authoritarianism."[3]

As the first general election since 2011, the 2016 ballots are a major benchmark as regards the state of the reform process and parliamentary performance since then. Despite local and regional elections allowing Moroccans to directly choose their representatives in 2015 for the first time in the kingdom's history, this ballot was mostly seen as merely leading up to the general elections, in some ways testing the waters. And indeed the PJD won most seats, seemingly hinting at people being content enough to vote for them again – be it because of the state of the reform process or a perceived lack of options. In fact, with pre-election polling banned in the year between 2015's local and regional elections and the 2016 general elections, the campaigns heated up quickly between the PJD and its main contender, the Authenticity and Modernity Party (PAM), albeit in a somewhat superficial fashion.[4]

The following sections will first elaborate on the Moroccan political system, with a particular focus on the reform process that begun in 2011 and included a constitutional referendum and early general elections. Have the reforms brought about change in an effective manner? How does legislative performance compare to the framework set; that is, how do the original ambitions compare to reality? Subsequently, the 2016 general elections will be analysed, drawing further conclusions for the state of the reform path.

I. Political overview pre-2011

Morocco has a history of multi-party elections that dates back to 1962 and has had a multi-party system since its independence (1956) despite all non-democratic actions in the country. In 1956, Sultan Mohammed IV provided a basis for Morocco-style monarchy. His

[1] See paragraph 1 of the Moroccan Constitution.
[2] Maghraoui, *How the Moroccan monarchy ducked the Arab Spring*, 2015, 36-39.
[3] Catherine Sweet, *Democratization Without Democracy Political Openings and Closures in Modern Mo rocco*, 2001.
[4] Fabiani, *Hollow Rivalry in Morocco's Upcoming Elections*, 2016.

first multi-party parliament, due to the "credibility and viability of system", was "tenuous at times."[5] Until the redesigning of parliament, the king could name himself prime minister, legalising his supreme power as the central figure of government. In the new constitution written and published by Hassan II after the national referendum in December 1962, the position of king was secured. The king was not only the royal symbol of his nation but also the guardian of the constitution. Since "the previous unicameral parliament did not engender popular support,"[6] Hassan II changed the structure of parliament to a twin chamber with Section III, since which the parliament of Morocco has remained bicameral. This complex system is not necessarily undemocratic – in fact, many modern states adopted democracy through a bicameral system, even though a bicameral system "originated in the essentially pre-democratic view that the representation of the nation required both an upper and lower house, in the class-conscious sense of upper and lower."[7]

The external structure of the Upper House in Morocco (Majlis al-Mustashārīn) is similar to the British House of Lords, as the members are not directly elected and have no final say. Today, the Upper House has 120 members elected by indirect universal suffrage for six years, of whom 72 members represent local constituencies, 20 represent professional chambers, eight represent employers or professional organisations, and 20 represent employees.[8] Since 1996, Moroccan citizens have elected members to the Lower House. Until the 2001 constitution, the general political landscape showed some balance between the Upper and Lower House, and the king.

After independence, a strong nationalist trend arose in Morocco, which was commonly reflected in post-independence politics. The country's loyal young elites found a new platform in 2008.

According to Article 1 of the last constitution (2011), which was written by a commission of experts, Morocco is a democratic, social, constitutional and parliamentary monarchy. The numerous Moroccan political parties mirror the pluralistic tradition of the country – although analysts often conclude that ideological differences are trumped by particular interests. Muhammad VI seemingly passed on some of these powers with the 2011 revision of the constitution, yet he still remains by far the most powerful actor, controlling almost all decisions.

II. Political parties pre-2011

Even though Morocco has been always considered the most liberal country in the region, a strong Islamic trend on the political stage has long existed and enjoyed success. All the parties, even the leftist parties of Morocco, have some religious – or rather Islamic – aspects in their election programmes.

Without analysing the political parties and general elections, it is not possible to understand today's transition from exclusive authoritarian rule. Elections have been held since 1962, but since 1955 the country has had prime ministers that have been appointed by the king. From the 1960s through the 1980s, King Hassan did not allow any liberalisation progress in politics; he attempted to stop the first coalition of Arab world and used his power to disable other political elements, such as arresting the Secretary of Communist Party of Morocco (CPM). In May 1960, the government of Abdullah Ibrahim was removed, and the relationships between the government and King Hassan II deteriorated. This was the beginning of the period of rule which spread from 1960 to 1975, years of absolute autocracy in Morocco.

In July 1970, after five years of emergency rule in the country, a general election was organised to choose the members of the Chamber of Representatives, which was adopted by a referendum in the same year, having been boycotted by the USFD and Istiqlal Party (IP). Ambitions for a new and democratic constitution are an old story in Morocco, cropping up again during the protests through the popular Arabic call of *al-sha'b yurīd dustūr jadīd* ('the people want a new constitution').

In the 1970s, under the influence of the leftist global movement, left groups were also gaining supporters in Morocco, and the 'Moroccan Communist Party', 'Party of Liberation and Socialism', and 'National Union of Popular Forces' were founded, although this trend was strongly curbed by the king in the name of "defending the Moroccan tradition" – a lo-

[5] Ketterer, *From One Chamber to Two*, 2001.
[6] Ibid.
[7] Loewenberg and Patterson, *Comparing Legislatures*, 1979, 121.
[8] Apap, *At a Glance, Morocco: Political Parties and the EU*, 2015.

gical sentiment since challenging "tradition" is taboo in the country, as it is through tradition that the monarchy finds its legitimacy.

For years, numerous parties have participated in the elections and many of them have gained seats in parliament, more than in many "democratic countries" since the electoral threshold is set at 6% for the House of Representatives and only 3% for the national list. Besides, in addition to new trends in political area, topical events in the country can also spark off new political parties – such as the 'Green March'. During the Green March three new parties were formed: the Party of Action (PA) in 1974; the Socialist Union of Popular Forces (USFD) in 1975, which broke away from the National Union of Popular Forces (UNFP), founded in 1959 following a secession within the IP; in addition to the National Rally of Independents (RNI) in 1977.[9] Despite a traditional multi-party system in Morocco, the democratic processes at all levels need to be upgraded.

The PJD (The Justice and Development Party)

The PJD was founded as the Popular Democratic and Constitutional Movement in 1967 before changing to its current name in 1998. It has been one of the most active opposition parties, demanding reforms and the improvement of the economic situation in the kingdom. It emerged from the context of growing Islamist opposition to the monarchy's policies, nevertheless becoming an accepted opposition party within Morocco's political arena, one that agreed to play according to the rules of the game established by the king. For the monarch, the PJD thus represents the Islamist spectrum and allows him a more confrontational stance towards other groups, such as Al-'Adl wa-l-Ihsan. Up until 2011 the PJD had always been represented in the parliament but had never headed a government – due to attempts by the state to prevent such a development rather than a lack of public support. At present, the party's general secretary Abdelilah Benkirane is Morocco's prime minister, and after again garnering the most seats in 2016, he will most likely remain in this position.

The PJD is the co-opted Islamist movement in Morocco – particularly after the legal reform known as *Mudawwana*,[10] introduced and passed by the country's parliament in 2004, was ultimately approved by the PJD despite initial criticism. While the issue seemed to exemplify a more general debate about identity in Morocco,[11] the role of the party is particularly interesting. Although the Islamist spectrum opposed the reform, the PJD eventually agreed to it, arguing that it had been adopted through democratic means. This decision made the PJD the pragmatic branch of the Islamist movements,[12] opening opportunities for itself in the political arena while at the same time further isolating more conservative groups, like Al-'Adl wa-l-Ihsan. Accordingly, this reform and the way it came into being may prevent follow-up liberalisation.[13]

Nevertheless, the PJD still seemed to be self-censoring its moves in order not to appear as a threat and lose acceptance from the palace. This behaviour of the PJD can be exemplified with a closer look at the 2002 elections. Here, it refrained from using one of its main advantages over most other parties: a nationwide infrastructure and a high (compared to its adversaries) degree of internal cohesion. In 2002, the PJD registered candidates in only 56% of the constituencies. Despite this caution it still won 43 seats, an increase of 33 compared to the previous term, and became the strongest party in the parliament.

Although he has allowed the PJD to gradually gain importance politically over recent years, Muhammad VI has sought to contain the party's influence. When the PJD won four more seats in the 2007 general election, the monarch began to counter this development with a twofold approach. First, the electoral law was changed in 2008, only one year before the important local elections of 2009. Embedded in the ongoing attempts at regionalisation, the kingdom's constituencies were divided into rural and urban (i.e. more than 35,000 inhabitants) categories. The former would continue to follow a candidate-centred voting system while the latter were

[9] For an official list see: http://www.maroc.ma/en/content/organisations.
[10] This reform strengthened women's rights in marriage, inheritance and divorce especially and was interna tionally applauded as step on the kingdom's path to liberalisation.
[11] For an overview of this debate over the years leading up to 2003 see Buskens, *Recent Debates on Fam ily Law Reform in Morocco*, 2003, 89-117 in particular.
[12] Brown and Hamzawy, *Between Religion and Politics*, 2010, 90-91.
[13] Cavatorta and Dalmasso, *Liberal outcomes through undemocratic means*, 2009.

organised in party lists from then on. In total, 85% of the constituencies in Morocco were defined as rural, which had a significant negative impact on the PJD in particular. Secondly, and most prominently, the palace encouraged the formation of the PAM in 2008. The PAM ran against the PJD for the first time in the 2009 local elections, aiming to lower the latter's impact.

After early elections were held in 2011, the PJD became the strongest faction. The PJD had risen in popularity since a significant element of the demands raised in the streets included the fight against corruption and nepotism, and the party was largely seen as being more morally reliable than its peers. Moreover, the PJD was perceived as down-to-earth and in touch with the Moroccans and their actual needs, unlike the rest of the political establishment. This image appears to be widely accepted, and might enable the party to garner support even among those who usually do not favour Islamist political goals.[14]

The PJD became the strongest party in these elections and in accordance with the new constitution Muhammad VI appointed the party's leader Benkirane as prime minister, while the PJD also engaged in a coalition government. Indeed, the hopes for this seemingly different party were to bring about change and tackle what was widely perceived as Morocco's gravest problems. As described above, fighting corruption was one of the pillars of the PJD's campaign, but it also specifically included ensuring economic growth.

However, while this seems to represent success for the PJD, it is an almost impossible task. Despite being formally in power now, the powers of the parliament, government and prime minister are fairly limited compared to that of the king. As the following elaborations will highlight, most criticisms of the pace as well as the content of political decision-making and the implementation of reforms are likely to be directed at the government, whereas the possibilities of it satisfying these demands are restricted.

The PAM (The Party for Authenticity and Modernity)

The PAM was founded on 7th August 2008 by Fu'ad al-Himma, former Deputy Minister of Interior and close friend of Muhammad VI. Beginning with the 'Movement for All Democrats,' al-Himma began to transform the movement into a political party that became a force to be reckoned with in the 2009 local elections. The PAM's foundation was at least viewed favourably if not aided by the monarchy – given al-Himma's close ties to the palace some even called him "the king's joker." In fact, Morocco's party laws stipulate that changing parties is not permitted for elected officials, yet many of the political figures joining the PAM gained their experience in the ranks of other parties. This highlights in an exemplary fashion how establishing the PAM as a counterweight to a strengthened PJD was subject to the palace's approval. Selectively enforcing such legislation was further combined with simultaneous accusations of corruption against the PJD, directly attacking one of the columns that the PJD drew their legitimacy from. The PAM easily burst onto the public scene through election to parliament. During the very brief campaign in 2008, al Himma cultivated a charismatic aura as the "king's man" and his newly formed party list captured all seats in the electoral districts where it competed.[16]

The PAM presents itself as a remarkably elite-structured party, "focusing on transformation of the country [...] and reforms that are structured by His Majesty King Mohammed VI."[17] It aims "to keep pace with dynamics of the transition of the country in all areas" according to its general party programme. Since its foundation in 2008, the PAM is yet to deliver a more concrete vision for the kingdom and its genesis can thus be interpreted as a 'safety valve,' designed to contain the PJD and ensure the palace's influence in the legislative branch.[18]

The PAM held its first Congress in February 2009, attended by 500 members; women and young people accounted for a significant proportion of their participants. One of the major tasks[19] is to promote gender equality and valo-

[14] Pelham, *How Morocco dodged the Arab Spring*, 2011.
[15] Le Point, *El-Himma*, le joker du roi, 2010.
[16] Liddell, *Morocco: Modern Politics or the Politics of Modernity?*, 2008.
[17] Cf. the official parties' official websites: http://www.pam.ma/ and https://www.facebook.com/CommunicationPAM/about/.
[18] Buehler, *Safety-Valve Elections and the Arab Spring*, 2013, 144.
[19] The other tasks are, strengthen democratic construction, providing security in various dimensions, radiation investigation at the international level and providing effective governmental system -linking responsibility of accountability to ensure the efficacy of public policies.

rise the role of women in Moroccan society. However, the pro-palace politics of the party also became a target of the young generation during the 2011 protests. According to some observers, the PAM is no authentic player in the country's multi-party landscape: "the regime opted for the creation of its own political party to compete directly with PJD in the electoral field."[20]

The USFD (The Socialist Union of Popular Forces)

The USFD is Morocco's leading leftist party, the result of a split from the IP in 1959. It calls itself a "Democratic Socialist" party, was established in 1975 and formed a left-centre government between 1999 and 2002. "In the 70s, when left-wing ideologies were attracting considerable support from the population,"[21] USFD seized its chance to rise, despite the traditional nationalist-Islamist trend. The party peaked at 57 seats in the 1997 elections, after which it also led the government coalition. In 2002 the USFD garnered 50 seats, in 2007 its share further decreased to 38. The In the 2011 general elections the party won 39 seats.

The creation of the USFD relied largely on the resistance fighters, members of the liberation army, the working class and the progressive wing of the IP.[22] According to its official website,[23] there was a connection between the autocratic period in 1970s, the murder of Mehdi Ben Barka and Omar Benjelloun and the execution of a number of leaders and activists of the Union. The ideology of the party found itself in long-term conflict with the Moroccan palace. However, as the radical-left activities of the USFD decreased after 2010, the party "has strayed from its progressive, modernist roots and is now relying more and more on conservative rural elites, who have come to control many of the party's decision-making positions."[24] On paper, the USFD is a "defender of justice and equity and the right to a balanced environment, world peace and tolerance among peoples,"[25] even though the February Demonstrations and urban-based movements after 2011 were not officially supported by the party.

The RNI (The National Rally of Independents)

As a favourite political party of the palace, the RNI was founded in 1978 by Ahmed Osman prime minister at the time as well as husband of King Hassan's sister. Together with King Hassan, he led the 'Green March' against Spanish power in Western Sahara, which increased confidence in the party in long term. The RNI was the successful "democratic face" of King Hassan to weaken the other parties in parliament. In 1981, the RNI joined the ranks of the opposition, participating in the control of government action and evaluation of public policies.[26] In 1997, the party became the first political force present in both houses of Parliament. In the general elections of the 2000s the party always held more than 25% of the parliamentary seats.

According to the RNI's self-definition, the party aims to improve citizens' living conditions, strengthen the democratic system, modernise the country and ensure a fair distribution of wealth. However, the party could not change how others described it, still perceived as the advanced hand of palace: "Its original function was as a counterweight to parties critical of the monarchy."[27] Since the foundation of the PAM ın 2008, the RNI has been considered the "another/second" centrist, monarchist party in the parliament, thus losing its precedence.

The IP (The Istiqlal Party)

The Istiqlal ('Independence') Party is one of the oldest political groups in Morocco, founded in 1937 as the National Party for Istiqlal, which demanded independence from France between 1944 and 1953. The party remains proud of the role it played in the national actions of the 'Patriots in the North and the South' in the 1940s and 1950s and that the history of Istiqlal began with the independence fight. Since its foundation, Islamist, nationalist and conservative policy has continued to pervade, which brought in early 1950s sympathisers and supporters in high

[20] Amos, In Morocco, *The Arab Spring's Mixed Bounty*, 2012.
[21] La Serra, *Multi-Party Political System In Morocco Has Always Been A Veneer For Authoritarianism*, no date.
[22] A'boushi, *Returning to Political Parties?*, 2013.
[23] Cf. the party's official website: http://usfp.org.ma/fr/.
[24] Monjib, *The USFP and the Moroccan Monarchy: the Power of Patronage*, 2010.
[25] As presented on the party's official website: http://usfp.org.ma/fr/principes-et-objectifs/.
[26] The historical background of the party, http://rni.ma/, no date.
[27] Vish, *Morocco's Governing Islamists Remain Vulnerable*, 2013.

numbers. According to the IP, the party had 80,000 members in 1952. In its early years, election results showed that it was mainly successful in so-called traditional or conservative cities such as Fes und Taza, while the breakaway USFD was gaining power among young urban groups. The party has been historically dominated by the traditional elite.[28]

The IP did not go public immediately after independence, but as a national liberation movement mobilised people against foreign occupation until the country was liberated. After independence, the party claims to have shared in a number of accomplishments, such as expelling colonial armies, providing the basic building blocks for the national economy and creating the necessary administrative facilities.

Istiqlal has always played a central role in Morocco and has had the potential power to change or even build a "political balance" between the palace and parliament. Two historical examples prove that the IP is a game changer on the political stage. Firstly, the party held a pioneering position above other breakaway parties in providing multiparty elections in the country, styling itself as a strong "dealer" against the king's absolute monarchy. Since the first cabinet positions all went to Istiqlal in 1958, it has used this advantage over the other parties and formed part of "many coalition governments from the late 1970s until the mid-1980s."[29] It boycotted in 1970 on the grounds that the referendum approving the king's new constitution and the parliamentary elections that followed were evidence of the complete lack of power afforded to any actor other than the monarch in the new constitutional system."[30] After the so-called Arab Spring protests, the party won 60 out of 325 seats in the general election.

Secondly, the IP played a great role in building the first 'Koutla' coalition in 1992, which won a total of 114 of the parliament seats (52 seats from the IP, 52 seats from the breakaway USPD and 10 from the third member of the coalition, the Party of Progress and Socialism) in the 1993 elections despite the all effort from King Hassan II to build a consensus government, which aimed to weaken Koutla.

III. Protests and reforms

In early 2011 Morocco was hit by a wave of protests, inspired by others across the region. People gathered in the streets to express their dissatisfaction with the economic and political situation in the kingdom, demanding reforms and an improvement in their living conditions. Indeed, the 20th February Movement was soon formed in an attempt to give voice to the country's urban youth; it managed to take thousands of people to the streets of Morocco's larger cities, and "begged to differ with the concept of Moroccan exceptionalism".[31]

The movement was founded when protests took place in 53 of the kingdom's 75 districts, attracting a considerable number of participants. Many following this movement were youths,[32] demanding political reforms towards a "parliamentary monarchy"[33] and better prospects for themselves and the country at large. With global media attention locked on what was soon coined the 'Arab Spring,' a heavy crackdown on the 20th February Movement and other groups was unlikely as long as their rallies remained peaceful – and indeed they were referred to as such and picked up on intensively by different media outlets.[34] The movement continued to call on protesters to rally peacefully[35] despite some rallies escalating the next day and the media coverage turning more critical.[36]

---

[28] Jalid, *The pull of populist politics in Morocco*, no date.
[29] The North Africa Journal, *Organizations: Morocco – Istiqlal Party*, no date.
[30] Willis, *Politics and Power in the Maghreb. Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco from Independence to the Arab Spring*, 2012, 69.
[31] El Idrissi, *February 20 Movement: reflections of a young activist*, 2012.
[32] See Griethe, *Zwischen Makhzen, Tradition und Moderne - Kann Marokkos Jugend einen Wandel be wirken?*, 2016.
[33] Al-Zuwayn, *Founder of 20 February's 'Facebook' page: a parliamentary monarchy... minimal and yet high est political umbrella of what we demand*, 2011, 7.
[34] For example the country's largest daily newspaper Al-Masā' (170,000 circulation, independent paper founded by Rachid Niny in 2006) featured the events extensively, dedicating most of the pages 1-8 of the following issue to it.
[35] Post on the movement's Facebook page on 21 February 2011.
[36] The paper Al-Masā' for instance called clashes and the number of dead and injured people the following day the result of the movement's actions. See Al-Zuwayn and Al-Andalusi, 5 dead and 128 wounded among the security forces, 2011, 1.

However, the royal response to these protests and demands was proactive; it almost seemed as if the king did not want to make the mistake of delivering 'too little, too late' like other incumbents in the region did. Muhammad VI established the Economic and Social Council in Morocco, an ”institution of good governance and development” that aimed to tackle several of the demands raised by Moroccans in the streets, combining economic growth with 'a new social charter', 'social justice' and 'national solidarity'[37] for the country as a whole, and the youth in particular. In doing so, Muhammad VI sought to relativise the emergence of the movement, signalling his awareness and willingness to engage in gradual reform.

The monarch also announced a constitutional referendum, which took place on 1st July 2011, and early parliamentary elections, which were held on 25th November 2011, in order to pacify those rallying in the streets. And indeed, the king appears to have stolen the protests' thunder, most prominently by appointing the prime minister from the main opposition party without bringing about meaningful change.

The appointed nature of the committee charged with preparing constitutional changes as well as the limited time between the publication of the new draft and the actual ballot were criticised by protesters and activists – the latter was released on 17th June 2011, while the referendum took place on 1st July 2011, and accordingly there was little public debate possible. Given the aforementioned approach, it appears likely that the absence of such a discussion was no accident on the part of the palace. The results of the ballot as such showed a turnout of 73% and an approval of 98.5% and thus seemed to prove the lack of public dialogue on opposing views.

Several amendments were introduced,[38] most of which seek to limit the powers that lie with the monarch. The person of the king is no longer “sacred and inviolable" but “inviolable and demands respect” (Article 46). The monarch still appoints the prime minister, but he now needs to select him from the strongest party in the last elections (Article 47). Moreover, the king can no longer appoint top-ranking diplomats and candidates for other positions (such as leading state-owned companies) alone but needs to consult with the prime minister in doing so, via the Council of Ministers over which he presides (Articles 91, 49 and 48). The prime minister can now dissolve the parliament after consultation with the king, a right previously held by the latter alone (Article 104). The judiciary is now independent from executive and legislative branches (Article 107), while women's status has been empowered from just 'political equality' to 'civil, political, economic, social, cultural and environmental equality' (Article 19). Notably, the Berber language Tamazight is now officially recognised as a language of the state that needs to be protected and promoted in the same way as Arabic (Article 5).

Muhammad VI, however, remained solely in charge of the military, religious matters, foreign policy and the judiciary (even though it was declared independent) and can appoint and replace the prime minister as well as members of the cabinet (after consulting with the PM). Accordingly, the changes made seemed more symbolic and cosmetic in nature. In fact, the proactive stance with which the king has already announced constitutional changes in mid-March 2011 and the prompt realisation of a referendum seemed more like an attempt to pacify protests than bring about any meaningful reforms. In addition, any changes still require thorough implementation and enforcement.

In addition to the constitutional referendum, Muhammad VI also announced early elections, which after being postponed, took place in late November 2011. The PJD rose in popularity since a significant demand raised in the streets was a fight against corruption and nepotism, and the party was largely seen as being more morally reliable than its peers. Moreover, the PJD was perceived as down-to-earth and in touch with Moroccans and their actual needs, unlike the rest of the political establishment. As per the official election programme published by the PJD, the goal was that of “institutional and legislative rehabilitation,”[39] for which the constitutional amendments were not seen as sufficient to strengthen the legislative branch, and for the process of regionalisation to be a democratic one.[40]

---

[37] Muhammad VI, *Texte intégral du discours de SM le Roi à l'occasion de la cérémonie d'installation du conseil économique et sociale*, 2011.
[38] For a more thorough analysis of the constitutional changes see Saliba, *Change or Charade?*, 2016.
[39] Parti de la Justice et du Développement, *Election Programme*, 2011, 29.
[40] Ibid, 31.

The PJD became the strongest party after the 2011 elections, and according to the new constitution, Muhammad VI appointed the party's leader Abdelilah Benkirane as prime minister, while the PJD also engaged in a coalition government.[41] Indeed, the hopes for this seemingly different party were that it would bring about change and tackle what were widely perceived as Morocco's gravest problems. As described above, fighting corruption was one of the pillars of the PJD's campaign, but it also specified ensuring economic growth. An achievement even more considerable, according to well-known Moroccan commentator Mohammed Darif, was that the PJD's victory marked the "end of the Islamic scarecrow" leading to "the takeover of the political arena."[42]

However, while this seems to represent success for the PJD, it was an almost impossible task from the beginning, and the following brief example might highlight why: although formally in power now, the powers of the parliament, government and prime minister are fairly limited compared to that of the king. And, indeed, Muhammad VI urged the Benkirane government to speed up the reform process, presenting them a roadmap for government action,[43] including judicial reforms, regionalisation, and the inclusion of more women and youth. When the prime minister seemingly failed to deliver, he addressed the king with an explanation for his performance while also warning of an "Arab Spring in Morocco."[44] This move, in turn, was heavily criticised by Abdel Tayyif Wahba, a senior member of the PAM, via the pro-monarchy newspaper Al-Sabah, accusing Benkirane and his fellow party members of "double talk".[45] Indeed, as Mawlay Idris Al-Mawdun put it, "the honeymoon between palace and government is over"[46] – if there ever was one.[47]

The momentum for protesters and new or established movements to take their demands to the street seems to have hit a high ceiling in 2011 and dropped significantly since. The main organised political opposition, the PJD, has already been in power. As for the 20th February Movement, its traction decreased once established political players joined the ranks of protesters and state repression took care of the rest – with an estimated more than 2,000 activists jailed since 2011.[48]

The local and regional elections of September 2015 were the first public performance benchmark for the PJD-led government since the general elections 2011. Moreover, it was the first time since that Moroccans were able to cast their votes and directly elect their representatives. The PJD garnered the most seats nationwide, followed by the PAM and the IP.[49] In a way, this result was a confirmation of the PJD's work since 2011 despite criticism raised from the palace or its watchdog the PAM.

IV. The 2016 elections

The past year, between the 2015 local and regional elections and the legislative ones in 2016, has seen nationwide campaigning from the PJD and PAM that sought to stress their different positions. Yet upon closer consideration – and when keeping in mind that the authority to make strategic mid- or long-term decisions rests with the king – the parties' programmes revealed little significantly different positions. In fact, most overall frameworks and measures seem to be subject to consensus, with only details showing diverging views.[50] Increasing the retirement age, for instance, was not a point of contention, nor was reforming subsidies.

Key areas of concern to the improvement of socio-economic conditions, however, remained largely untouched. Enhancing the performance of Morocco's education system in order to meet the demand of the la-

[41] The 20 February Movement remained largely silent during the elections - only some members openly advocated boycotting the ballots along with the country's largest Islamist movement *Al-'Adl wa-l-Iḥsān*.
[42] Darif, *The end of the Islamist scarecrow*, 2011.
[43] King Muhammad VI of Morocco, *Speech on the occasion of the Throne Feast*, 2012; Al-Hafizi, *King draws roadmap for government*, 2012.
[44] Najdi, *Benkirane warns of Arab Spring and sends letters to close confidents of the King*, 2012.
[45] Baha, *Benkirane relays his apology to the King via Al-Sabah*, 2012.
[46] Al-Mawdun, *Benkirane's predicament between the palace and Aftati accusing Al-Himma*, 2012.
[47] See also Maghraoui, *How the Moroccan monarchy ducked the Arab Spring*, 2015.
[48] Rachidi, *Inside the movement: what is left of Morocco's February* 20, 2015.
[49] For a more thorough analysis see Sadiqi, *Morocco's Emerging Democracy: The 2015 Local and Regional Elections*, 2015.
[50] Abou El Farah, *Législatives 2016 : où sont les programmes des grands partis?*, 2016.

bour market would be one such aspect. Another one would be the issue of corruption and nepotism throughout the kingdom. Here, a lack of competition hinders development in many sectors because a select few companies – linked to the inner circle of power the Makhzen – dominate the market. Moreover, political interference and the ensuing lack of transparency in decision-making, licensing and more are further hampering investment and development.

Hailed as a harbinger of change and reform in 2011's legislative elections, the PJD hereby faced its first subsequent test at the national level. Indicating how satisfied voters are with the performance of Benkirane's government and the PJD at large, ballots were cast on 7th October 2016 and the PJD indeed reaffirmed its position as the kingdom's strongest party, garnering a total of 125 seats – 18 more than in 2011. In order to govern, however, the PJD will again have to form a coalition in order to secure the majority of the parliament's 395 seats.

The largest shift could be observed with the PAM's results, however. Having gained the fourth most seats in 2011 with 47, the PAM is now the second strongest faction in the Moroccan parliament with 102 seats, leaving the IP with 46 (2011: 60) and the RNI with 37 (2011: 52). It seems far-fetched for a coalition to include both the PJD and PAM, but the majority of the remaining parties have either only cautiously declared their support for one of the two strongest factions, or have refrained from positioning themselves at all. This to some extent reflects how little ideology influences potential cooperation – after all, both the PJD and PAM each garnered the support of one socialist party before the ballots.

While Benkirane was quick to thank the voters for their trust, interpreting the results as strong support for the PJD's path since 2011, a closer look reveals more critical aspects. The turnout was already low in 2011 at 45%, and further declined to 43% in the recent elections. The absence (if not boycott) of various influential parties or movements, such as Al-'Adl wa-l-Iḥsān, led more than half of the electorate to eschew the ballot. Accordingly, concerns can be raised regarding the seriousness of Morocco's reform process for a more participatory and democratic system.

Pointing to the – albeit overstated – party competition, particularly between the PJD and PAM, has allowed the monarchy to present a pluralistic process of legislative election, one that is officially considered a success.[51] This is of value to the kingdom, especially regarding its image abroad as well as its image with potential or already active donors and supporters.

V. Conclusion

The recent parliamentary elections have confirmed the ruling PJD's hold on power. Winning the national ballots for the second time in a row appears to undeline that Morocco's reform process is on track. Indeed, the kingdom's trajectory since the regional wave of protests arrived in 2011 has been one in which changes to political institutions have been a key component. With the constitutional referendum in 2011, steps were taken towards a parliamentarisation of the country's politics. The first elections already yielded a victory of the kingdom's main political opposition party, from which the king – in accordance with the new constitution – had to pick the prime minister. Benkirane's government has since been facing major challenges, and tackling them has proven hard, particularly considering the still limited powers of parliament and government vis-à-vis the monarch.

Consequently, the PJD has struggled to meet the demands of the people and the situation has, if at all, only slightly improved since 2011. Economic malaise, a comparatively weak educational system, corruption and nepotism have prevailed over the parliament's actions. Nevertheless, the PJD won both last year's local and regional ballots as well as the parliamentary elections in 2016. A decreasing voter turnout combined with a considerable number of people dissatisfied with government and parliamentary performance, however, hint at a growing disappointment with politics, and with the reform process. With many of the demands from 2011's protests unmet, and lacking legislative and government authority, the PJD will have a difficult second term.

The monarchy's deck of cards has prevailed. Measures taken since 2011 have not managed – and arguably were not intended – to change the 'balance' of power, the status quo in Morocco.

[51] The official results can be accessed here: http://www.maroc.ma/fr/actualites/elections-legislatives-2016.

Conclusions

With the results of parliamentary elections in Jordan and Morocco now official, how do we evaluate them? Were they a great victory for the two kingdoms' gradual reform processes? Is this an important step towards a more participatory political system in which the will of the people has a larger influence?

The previous sections have in great detail shed light on the situation leading up to 2011's protests and their aftermath, before then attempting to place the recent ballots in this context. Jordan and Morocco have taken a similar trajectory since 2011 in that they changed their constitutions and held elections recently as benchmarks for the state of affairs five years later.

A moderate Islamist party, the PJD, became the strongest faction for the second time in Morocco, even gaining more seats than 2011. In Jordan, (yet another) new election law and the non-boycott of the IAF seem like successes. Low voter turnout in both countries, however, quickly casts doubt on this narrative.

But do these developments exhibit a process of liberalisation, or even one of democratisation? In fact, the two terms liberalisation and democratisation appear to be used in almost synonymous fashion in many analyses of political developments in Jordan and Morocco, and other states of the region. There are significant differences between these terms, though, and a higher degree of selectivity would be in order.

A somewhat limbo stage between transition and a fully-fledged autocracy was Thomas Carothers' observation back in 2002 when he declared the "end of the transition paradigm" – which treated transitions as one-way streets towards democracy – and conceptualised the idea of setbacks and grey zones.[1] Daniel Brumberg took this further when inferring that countries in the region have "witnessed a 'transition' away from – and then back toward – authoritarianism," classifying the majority of reforms as "tactical political openings."[2] Indeed the concept of successive waves of liberalisation and deliberalisation has permeated the study of Middle Eastern regimes ever since.

The responses of Jordan's Abdullah II and Morocco's Muhammad VI to the protest in 2011 followed this pattern too. When facing established and newly founded movements demanding reforms, both monarchs answered with measures that resembled steps toward a more participatory, more liberalised system, yet remained unable to effectively change the status quo.

Stressing the role of the parliament was one of the key components of this response in both countries, seemingly fitting the picture of what Larbi Sadiki called parlamentarisation.[3] It appeared as if these countries were en route to a more participatory and liberal system since the mechanisms absorbed a large share of the momentum of 2011's protests. Such moves need to be classified as liberalisation rather than democratisation. A liberalisation of a political system revolves around the idea of a decrease in state restrictions and an increase in socio-political participation by means of party politics, civic engagement and participatory mechanisms. Liberalising a political system can be a step that eventually leads to a democratic polity.

In order to thoroughly implement changes that tackle some of the root causes of political demands rather than dealing with symptoms, reforms will need to go further. Legislatives, in order to function better as an effective control on the executive branch, need to have more meaningful capacities and powers if they are to fulfil what is considered their purpose. This holds specifically true in a setup of monarchies in which the majority of power is concentrated in the hands of the respective king. In the cases of Jordan and Morocco a democratisation in the true meaning of the word therefore appears unlikely in the near future.[4] Meanwhile, assorted domestic and regional factors have allowed for deliberalisations to offset a fair share of what had seemed like momentum for a sustainable reform process.

---

1 Carothers, *The End of the Transition Paradigm*, 2002.
2 Brumberg, *The Trap of Liberalized Autocracy*, 2002, 56.
3 Sadiki, *Arab 'Parliamentarisation' in the Arab Spring context*, 2016.
4 In fact, the use of the very expression seems paradoxical as the basic distinction between monarchy and democracy or republic has been one of the oldest guiding principles of the study of political systems, distinguishing mainly between hereditary succession and one elected or guided by qualification. Although these lines have become more blurred over the past decades (Cf. Brownlee, *Hereditary Succession in Modern Autocracies*, 2007), they are still determining factors.

References

A'boushi, El-Hussein, "The Socialist Union of Popular Forces Party in Morocco," in *Returning to Political Parties? Partisan Logic and Political Transformations in the Arab World*, edited by Myriam Catusse and Karam Karam (Paris: Ifpo, 2013), 131-173.

Abdullah II, "At the meeting with heads and members of the executive, legislative and judicial authorities," Speech, Amman, February 20, 2011, http://kingabdullah.jo/index.php/en_US/speeches/view/id/474/videoDisplay/0.html.

Abdullah II, "On the occasion of presenting the suggested constitutional amendments by the Royal Committee on Constitutional Review," Speech, Amman, August 14, 2011, http://kingabdullah.jo/index.php/en_US/speeches/view/id/482/videoDisplay/0.html.

Abou El Farah, Tahar, "Législatives 2016: où sont les programmes des grands partis?," *La vie éco*, July 20, 2016, http://lavieeco.com/news/politique/legislatives-2016-ou-sont-les-programmes-des-grands-partis.html.

Al Sharif, Osama, "Who are the winners and losers in Jordan's latest elections?," *Al Monitor*, September 28, 2016, http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2016/09/jordan-legislative-elections-winners-losers.html.

Al-Hafizi, Ihsan, "King draws roadmap for government action," *Al-Sabah*, July 31, 2012, http://www.assabah.press.ma/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=30145:2012-07-31-14-52-40&catid=37:cat-laune&Itemid=782.

Al-Khaytan, Fahd, "Constitutional amendments... Jordanians regain what seemed lost 50 years ago," *Ammon News*, August 14, 2011, http://www.ammonnews.net/article.aspx?articleno=94833.

Al-Mawdun, Mawlay Idris, "Benkirane's predicament between the palace and Aftati accusing Al-Himma," *Al-Masa'*, August 12, 2012, p. 1, http://issuu.com/almassae/docs/1831_12_08-2012.

Al-Zuwayn, Sana' and Nabil Al-Andalusi, "5 dead and 128 wounded among the security forces," *Al-Masa'*, February 22, 2011, p. 1, http://issuu.com/almassae/docs/1374.

Al-Zuwayn, Sana', "Founder of 20 February's "Facebook" page: a parliamentary monarchy... minimal and yet highest political umbrella of what we demand," *Al-Masa'*, February 21, 2011, p. 7, http://issuu.com/almassae/docs/1373.

Amos, Deborah, "In Morocco, The Arab Spring's Mixed Bounty," *NPR*, February 7, 2012, http://www.npr.org/2012/02/07/146526685/in-morocco-the-arab-springs-mixed-bounty.

Anderson, Lisa, "Searching Where the Light Shines: Studying Democratization in the Middle East," *Annual Review of Political Science* (9:2006), 189-214.

Apap, Joanna, "At a Glance, Morocco: Political Parties and the EU," *European Parliamentary Research Service*, June 2015.

Asseburg, Muriel (ed.), *Moderate Islamisten als Reformakteure. Rahmenbedingungen und programmatischer Wandel* (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, 2007).

Badareen, Bassam, "The night of toppled veteran Senators in Jordan," *Al Quds Al Arabi*, October 3, 2016, http://www.alquds.co.uk/?p=607254.

Baha, Rashid, "Benkirane relays his apology to the King via Al-Sabah," *Al-Sabah*, August 13, 2012, http://www.assabah.press.ma/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=30593:--qq---&catid=37:cat-laune&Itemid=782.

Bank, André, “Jordan: Between Regime Survival and Economic Reform,” in *Arab Elites. Negotiating the Politics of Change*, edited by Volker Perthes (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2004), 35-60.

Bondokji, Neven, “The Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan: Time to Reform,” *Brookings Policy Briefing*, April 2015, https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/en-muslim-brotherhood-in-jordan.pdf.

Brown, Nathan J. and Amr Hamzawy, *Between religion and politics* (Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2010).

Brownlee, Jason, “Hereditary Succession in Modern Autocracies,” *World Politics* 59 (4:2007), 595-628.

Brumberg, Daniel, “The Trap of a Liberalized Autocracy. Democratization in the Arab World?,” *Journal of Democracy* 13 (4:2002), 56-68.

Buehler, Matt, “Safety-Valve Elections and the Arab Spring: The Weakening (and Resurgence) of Morocco's Islamist Opposition Party,” *Terrorism and Political Violence* 25 (1:2013), 137-156.

Bunce, Valerie, *Subversive Institutions. The Design and the Destruction of Socialism and the State* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).

Buskens, “Recent Debates on Family Law Reform in Morocco,” *Islamic Law and Society* 10 (1:2003), 70-131.

Carothers, Thomas, “The End of the Transition Paradigm,” *Journal of Democracy* 13 (1:2002), 5-21.

Cavatorta, Francesco and Emanuela Dalmasso, “Liberal outcomes through undemocratic means: the reform of the Code de statute personnel in Morocco,” *Journal of Modern African Studies* 47 (4:2009), 487-506.

Darif, Mohammed, “The end of the Islamist scarecrow,” *Al-Masa'*, November 27, 2011, p. 1, http://issuu.com/almassae/docs/special_elections_maroc_2011.

Democracy Reporting International / The Identity Center, “Assessment of the Electoral Framework. The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan,” *Final Report of DRI and IC*, March 2013.

El Idrissi, Sarra, “February 20 Movement: reflections of a young activist,” *Open Democracy*, March 30, 2012, http://www.opendemocracy.net/5050/sarra-el-idrissi/february-20-movement-reflections-of-young-activist.

Fabiani, Riccardo, “Hollow Rivalry in Morocco’s Upcoming Elections,” *Sada*, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, September 22, 2016, http://tinyurl.com/zz4xrg8.

Fukuyama, Francis, “The End of History?,” *National Interest* (Summer issue:1989).

Gebhard, Thomas, “Wahl zum 18. Abgeordnetenhaus des Jordanischen Parlaments,” *Politischer Hintergrundbericht der Hanns-Seidel-Stiftung*, October 2016.

Ghazal, Mohammad, “Population stands at around 9.5 million, including 2.9 million guests,” *The Jordan Times*, January 30, 2016, http://www.jordantimes.com/news/local/population-stands-around-95-million-including-29-million-guests.

Griethe, Katharina, “Zwischen Makhzen, Tradition und Moderne - Kann Marokkos Jugend einen Wandel bewirken?,” in *Jugend im Nahen und Mittleren Osten*, edited by German Orient-Institute, January 2016, http://deutsche-orient-stiftung.de/de/publikationen-de/studien/doc_download/1184-jugend-im-nahen-und-mittleren-osten.

Haase, Imke et. al, “Parlamentswahlen in Jordanien,” *Länderbericht der Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung*, September 2016.

Hamid, Shadi, *Temptations of Power. Islamists & Illiberal Democracy in the Middle East* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014).

Huntington, Samuel, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968).

Islamic Action Front, “The constitutional amendments do not fully reflect the demands of the people,“official homepage, August 15, 2011.

Jalid, Mohamed, “The pull of populist politics in Morocco,” *Morocco Tomorrow*, no date, http://www.moroccotomorrow.org/the-pull-of-populist-politics-in-morocco/.

Ketterer, James P., “From One Chamber to Two: The Case of Morocco,” *Journal of Legislative Studies* 7 (1:2001), 135-150.

La Serra, Mariacarolina, “Multi-Party Political System In Morocco Has Always Been A Veneer For Authoritarianism,” no date, https://www.academia.edu/3234676/Multi-party_political_system_in_Morocco_a_veneer_for_authoritarianism.

Law on the Election of the House of Representatives, Law Number 6 of 2016, *Independent Election Commission*, http://www.entikhabat.jo/sites/default/files/2ParliamentaryElectionLaw-May2016EN.docx%20%281%29_0.pdf.

Le Point, “El-Himma, le joker du roi,” October 14, 2010, http://www.lepoint.fr/villes/el-himma-le-joker-du-roi-14-10-2010-1252455_27.php.

Lidell, James, “Morocco: Modern Politics or the Politics of Modernity?,” *Sada*, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, December 2, 2008, http://carnegieendowment.org/sada/22476.

Loewenberg, Gerhard and Samuel C. Patterson, *Comparing Legislatures* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1979).

Maghraoui, Abdeslam, “How the Moroccan monarchy ducked the Arab Spring,” *Orient* 56 (2:2015), 30-41.

Magid, Aaron, “ANALYSIS: Jordan’s Muslim Brotherhood comes in from the cold,” *The Middle East Eye*, June 21, 2016, http://www.middleeasteye.net/news/analysis-jordan-s-muslim-brotherhood-ends-election-boycott-1119065410.

Malkawi, Khetam, “IAF running on 20 ‘national’ lists in elections – official,” *The Jordan Times*, August 20, 2016, http://www.jordantimes.com/news/local/iaf-running-20-national%E2%80%99-lists-elections-%E2%80%94-official.

Martin-Muñoz, Gema, „Political Reform and Social Change in the Maghreb,“ in *The Barcelona Process. Building a Euro-Mediterranean Regional Community*, edited by Álvaro Vasconcelos and George Joffé (London and New York: Routledge, 2000), 96-132.

Monjib, Maâti, “The USFP and the Moroccan Monarchy: the Power of Patronage,” *Sada*, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, May 4, 2010, http://carnegieendowment.org/sada/?fa=40732.

Muhammad VI, “Speech on the occasion of the Throne Feast,” Rabat, July 30, 2012, http://www.maroc.ma/fr/discours-royaux/sm-le-roi-adresse-un-discours-%C3%A0-la-nation-%C3%A0-loccasion-de-la-f%C3%AAte-du-tr%C3%B4ne.

Muhammad VI, “Texte intégral du discours de SM le Roi à l'occasion de la cérémonie d'installation du conseil économique et sociale,” Casablanca, February 21, 2011, http://www.maroc.ma/fr/discours-royaux/texte-int%C3%A9gral-du-discours-de-sm-le-roi-loccasion-de-la-c%C3%A9r%C3%A9monie-dinstallation-du.

Najdi, Adil, “Benkirane warns of Arab Spring and sends letters to close confidents of the King,” *Al-Masa'*, August 10, 2012, p. 1, http://issuu.com/almassae/docs/1830_10-08-2012.

Parti de la Justice et du Développement, “Election Program,” official homepage, November 25, 2011.

Pelham, Nicolas, “How Morocco Dodged the Arab Spring,” *NYR Blog*, July 5, 2012, http://www.nybooks.com/blogs/nyrblog/2012/jul/05/how-morocco-dodged-arab-spring/.

Rachidi, Ilhem, “Inside the movement: what is left of Morocco’s February 20?,” *Middle East Eye*, February 25, 2015, http://www.middleeasteye.net/in-depth/features/what-left-morocco-s-february-20-movement-857852436.

Ryan, Curtis R., “Jordan in the crossfire of Middle East conflicts,” *Orient* 56 (4:2015), 42-49.

Ryan, Curtis R., “Jordan’s unfinished Journey: Parliamentary Elections and the State of Reform,” *Policy Brief of the Project on Middle East Democracy*, March 2013.

Sadiki, Larbi, “Arab ‘Parliamentarisation’ in the Arab Spring context: The normative vs. the practical,” *Orient* 57 (3:2016), 15-26.

Sadiqi, Fatima, “Morocco’s Emerging Democracy: The 2015 Local and Regional Elections,” *Wilson Center*, October 28, 2015, https://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/moroccos-emerging-democracy-the-2015-local-and-regional-elections.

Saliba, Ilyas, “Change or Charade? Morocco’s constitutional reform process 2011,” *Orient* 57 (3:2016), 50-55.

Schlumberger, Oliver, “Opening Old Bottles in Search of New Wine: On Nondemocratic Legitimacy in the Middle East,” *Middle East Critique* 19 (3:2010), 233-250.

Sweet, Catherine, “Democratization Without Democracy Political Openings and Closures in Modern Morocco,” *Middle East Report* 218 (Spring:2001).

The North Africa Journal, “Organizations: Morocco – Istiqlal Party,” no date.

van den Woldenberg, Benedikt, “Regionale Bedrohung als Vorwand für zunehmende Repression,” *DOI Kurzanalyse*, Dezember 2014.

Vish, Sakthivel, “Morocco's Governing Islamists Remain Vulnerable,” *The Washington Institute*, September 10, 2013, http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/moroccos-governing-islamists-remain-vulnerable.

Wardem, Bater Mohammed, “Constitutional amendments to become a means for political renaissance,” *Ammon News*, August 15, 2011, http://www.ammonnews.net/article.aspx?articleno=94917.

Wehler-Schoeck, Anja, “Jordanien nach den Wahlen.Des Königs neue Kleider?,” *Perspektive der Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung*, January 2013.

Wehler-Schoeck, Anja, “Parliamentary Elections in Jordan. A competition of mixed messages,” *International Policy Analysis der Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung*, September 2016.

Willis, Michael J., *Politics and Power in the Maghreb. Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco from Independence to the Arab Spring* (London: Hurst & Company, 2012).

All internet sources were accessed and verified on October 25, 2016.

Board of the German Orient-Foundation

Chairman of the Board

Philipp Lührs
Senior Vice President Global Head of Projects
Kuehne + Nagel (AG & Co.) KG

Deputy Chairpersons of the Board

Professor Dr. O. Faruk Akyol
Director
Yunus Emre Enstitüsü

Henry Hasselbarth
Vice President North & Central Europe, ret.
Emirates Airlines

Helene Rang
Dp. Chairperson and CEO of NUMOV
Proprietor Helene Rang & Partner

Members of the Board

H.E. Ali Bin Harmal Al Dhaheri
Chairman of the Executive Board of Governors
Abu Dhabi University

Burkhard Dahmen
Chairman of the Board of NUMOV
President and CEO
SMS group GmbH

Dr. Gunter Mulack
Director of the German Orient-Institute / Ambasador ret.

Prof. Dr. Dr. h.c. mult. Hermann Parzinger
President Stiftung Preußischer Kulturbesitz /
Prussian Cultural Heritage Foundation

Christian Ludwig Prinz von Preußen

Prof. Dr. Susanne Schröter
Professor of Southeast Asia Studies
Institute of Anthropology / Cluster of Excellence
“Formation of Normative Orders”
Goethe University Frankfurt

Prof. Dr. Rainer Schwarz

Johannes Selle
Member of the Federal German Parliament

Özgür Şimşek
Eren Holding A.S.

Alf Sörensen
General Manager
ABC International Bank plc, Frankfurt Branch

Board of Trustees of the German Orient-Foundation

President

Michelle Müntefering
Member of the Federal German Parliament

Vice President

Prof. Dr. Mathias Rohe
Faculty of Law
Friedrich Alexander University, Erlangen-Nuremberg

Members of the Board of Trustees

Klaus Uwe Benneter
Lawyer and Notary
HEUSSEN Rechtsanwaltsgesellschaft mbH

Dr. Wolf-Ruthart Born
Former State Secretary

Dr. Ralf Brauksiepe
Parliamentary State Secretary
Member of the German Parliament

Peter Brinkmann
Journalist

Henner Bunde
Permanent Secretary of the Berlin Department for Economics,
Technology and Research

Jürgen Chrobog
Former State Secretary
Member of the Board of NUMOV
Proprietor, The Foxhall-Group

Thomas Ellerbeck
Member of the Advisory Board of NUMOV
Member of the Management Board
TUI AG

Prof. Dr. Yousef Abdul Ghaffar
President of the Kingdom University in Bahrain

Prof. Dr. Friedhelm Gehrmann
Steinbeis University Berlin
Institute “Global Consulting and Government”

Günter Gloser, MdB
Member of the Federal German Parliament 1994-2013
Former Minister of State of the German Federal Foreign Office

Stephan Hallmann
ZDF Zweites Deutsches Fernsehen, German Television
Foreign Affairs

Prof. Dr. Michael Köhler
European Commission

Dr. Heinrich Kreft
Ambassador

Nizar Maarouf
Vice Director Vivantes International Medicine

Prof. Detlef Prinz
Proprietor
PrinzMedien

Dr. Nicolas Christian Raabe
Board of NUMOV Junior Section

Dr. Gerhard Sabathil
Director East Asia, Australia, Pacific
European External Service

Adem Sari
Managing Director
SARIAS Investment GmbH

Prof. Dr. jur. Dr. phil. Peter Scholz
Vice President District Court Tiergarten
Free University Berlin

Oltmann Siemens
Representative of the Worldbank, ret.

Joachim Steffens
Head of Development Policy
United Nations and UNCTAD Department
Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy

Dr. Willi Steul
Chairman of Deutschlandradio

Serkan Tören
Former Member of the Federal German Parliament

Board of NUMOV

Honorary Chairman

Gerhard Schröder
Former Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany

CEO

Helene Rang
Proprietor
Helene Rang & Partner

Chairman

Burkhard Dahmen
President and CEO
SMS group GmbH

Deputy Chairmen

Oliver Hermes
Chairman of the Board
WILO SE

Dr. Martin Herrenknecht
Chairman of the Board
Herrenknecht AG

Dr. Norbert Kloppenburg
Member of the Board
KfW Bankengruppe

Bernd Romanski
Proprietor
BJR Businessconcepts

Board Members

Martin Bachmann
Member of the Board
Wintershall Holding GmbH

Martin Bay
Proprietor
MB Zeppelin

Dieter Bellé
Mitglied des Vorstandes
LEONI AG

Ole van Beust
Former Prime Minister of Hamburg
Managing Director, Ole van Beust Consulting GmbH & Co. KG

Hubert F. Bock
Managing Director
Misr Bank-Europe GmbH

Jürgen Chrobog
Former State Secretary
Proprietor
The Foxhall-Group

Dieter Ernst
Former State Secretary
Proprietor, IWC-innovation and water consult

Bernd Eulitz
Member of the Board
Linde AG

Jürgen Fitschen
Former Co-Chief Executive Officer
Deutsche Bank AG

Michael Glos
Former Minister of Economics and Technology

Isabella Groegor-Cechowicz
Global General Manager
SAP SE

Alexander Knauf
General Partner
Knauf Gips KG

Hartmut Mehdorn
Former CEO, Airport Berlin Brandenburg BER

Günther Mull
Managing Director
DERMALOG GmbH

Matthias Müller
Chairman of the Board
Volkswagen AG

Marc Neumann
Managing Director
Ferrostaal Industrienanlagen GmbH

Armin Papperger
Chairman of the Board
Rheinmetall AG

Dr. Bernd Pfaffenbach
Former State Secretary

Achim Post
Member of the German Parliament

Philipp Reimnitz
Divisional Board Member
UniCredit Bank AG

Werner Schoeltzke
Proprietor
ENTRACON

Erich Staake
Chairman of the Board
Duisport AG

Jens-Ove Stier
Managing Director
Winterstein-Kontor GmbH

Niko Warbanoff
Chairman of the Board of Managing Directors
DB Engineering & Consulting GmbH

Hans Wilms
President
WILMS group

International Board

H.E. Abdullah bin Hamad Al Attiyah
President
Qatar Administrative Control and Transparency Authority, Qatar
Former Minister of Energy and Dp. Prime Minister

H.E. Eng. Mubarak A. Al-Khafrah
Chairman, National Industrialization Company (TASNEE), Saudi Arabia
Co-Chairman of Saudi-German-Business Dialogue

H.E. Mohammad Reza Nematzadeh
Minister of Industry, Mines and Trade of the I.R. of Iran

Honorary Board 1998-2005

Hans-Jürgen Wischnewski
Former Federal Minister †

Advisory Board of NUMOV

Jürgen Bubendey
Ambassador (ret.)
Federal Foreign Office

Ulrich Dill
Consultantf

Rudolf Dreßler
Ambassador (ret.)
Federal Foreign Office

Dr. Aly Masednah El-Kothany
Ambassador (ret.)

Thomas Ellerbeck
Member of the Management Board, TUI AG

Bernd Erbel
Ambassador (ret.)
Federal Foreign Office

Dr. Henryk Frystacki
Member of the Board of
Siemens AG (ret.)

Wilfried H. Graf
Member of the Board of
Arab Bank AG (ret.)

Dr. Gabriela Guellil
Federal Foreign Office

Dr. Jürgen Hellner
Ambassador (ret.)
Federal Foreign Office

Dr. Herbert Honsowitz
Ambassador (ret.)
Federal Foreign Office

Wolfgang Kenntemich
Editor in Chief
MDR Television

Dr. Hubert Lang
Ambassador (ret.)
Federal Foreign Office

Dr. Eckhard Lübkemeier
Ambassador (ret.)
Federal Foreign Office

Michael Ludwig
Lawyer / Member of the Executive Board
Verbundnetz Gas AG (ret.)

Dr. Gunter Mulack
Ambassador (ret.)
Director of the German Orient-Institute

Bernd Mützelburg
Ambassador (ret.)
Federal Foreign Office

Dr. Jürgen K. Nehls
Chairman of the Board of
Managing Directors of
Giesecke & Devrient GmbH (ret.)

Dietmar Ossenberg
Former Head of ZDF Cairo Office

Bernhard von der Planitz
Ambassador (ret.)
Federal Foreign Office

Klaus Rollenhagen
Managing Director (ret.)
Verband Beratender Ingenieure VBI

Dr. Gerhard Sabathil
Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Head of Delegation of the European Union to the Republic of Korea

Eberhard Schanze
Ambassador (ret.)
Federal Foreign Office

Dr. Rainald Steck
Ambassador (ret.)
Federal Foreign Office

Folkmar W. O. Stoecker
Ambassador (ret.)
Federal Foreign Office

Dr. Ludolf von Wartenberg
Former State Secretary
Former Managing Director BDI

Knut Witschel
Managing Director and Head of
Near & Middle East/Africa
Deutsche Bank AG (ret.)

Karl Heinz Wittek
Counsellor (ret.)
Federal Foreign Office

Dr. Thomas Wülfing
Lawyer, GERMELA (German Middle East Lawyer Association)

Impressum

Studie des Deutschen Orient-Instituts

Elections in Jordan and Morocco

Between ambitions and reality

Herausgeber:
Deutsches Orient-Institut
Direktor Dr. Gunter Mulack

Leitender Autor:
Benedikt van den Woldenberg

Autoren:
Gizem Erşahin-Hanrath
Rika Maetzig

Layout und Grafiken:
Brice Athimond

doi@deutsches-orient-institut.de
www.deutsches-orient-institut.de

Kronenstraße 1 - 10117 Berlin
Tel.: +49 (0)30-20 64 10 21 - Fax: +49 (0)30-30 64 10 29

Erscheinungsdatum: November 2016